| October 11, 2003
Northern Ireland Update
Political developments
Many of you to whom this is being sent keep an ear and eye on
news from Northern Ireland and will, therefore, know that after
a relatively quiet summer in terms of disturbances/violence and
in terms of political developments there has been a lot more political
activity in recent weeks. To a large degree this is due to a deadline
looming for the British government to set a date for new elections
to the Northern Ireland Assembly—if such elections are
to be held before Christmas. Let me try to give a very brief overview
of what is taking place, and try to put current developments in
the context of the longer peace process.
After the IRA and Loyalist paramilitary cease-fires in 1994
we entered a period of intense negotiations between the British
and Irish governments and the majority of Northern Ireland political
parties. These resulted in the Belfast Agreement signed on Good
Friday 1998 and endorsed in separate referenda in Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland in May 1998. Although 72% of the electorate
in Northern Ireland voted yes on the Agreement, only 51% of Unionist
voters did. The Agreement had asked Unionists to take a leap of
faith and enter into shared government with Nationalists (The
SDLP) and Republicans (Sinn Fein) before any firm declaration
from the IRA that their use of violence to achieve political aims
was permanently over or any of their weapons had been decommissioned.
Doubts about the IRAs commitment to using solely democratic politics
was one of the main reasons nearly 50% of Unionists voted against
the Agreement. Hence, ever since May 1998 most political news
in Northern Ireland has focused either on the internal struggle
for power between pro- and anti-Agreement factions within Unionism
or actions taken by the IRA and Sinn Fein to strengthen or undermine
confidence about their intention to use solely democratic means.
The narrow majority within Unionism in favor of the Agreement
was sufficient to allow elections to a new Northern Ireland Assembly
to take place and a power-sharing Executive to be formed, with
Ulster Unionist, SDLP, Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionist ministers
working together. The majority of people from all political backgrounds
in Northern Ireland recognized that it was an improvement to have
local politicians handling devolved powers, rather than ministers
appointed by the national government in Westminster exercising
“Direct rule.” However, fears fuelled both by anti-Agreement
Unionists and by Sinn Fein or IRA actions and inaction steadily
chipped away at the narrow majority within Unionism prepared to
risk the changes and risks entailed in the Agreement.
First Minister, David Trimble, had to keep going back to face
what were basically votes of no confidence in special meetings
of the Ulster Unionist Council. Each time he won a narrow majority
of support, allowing the Assembly and Executive to continue with
Ulster Unionist backing. But after each such endorsement by the
Council it wasn’t long before criticisms or events led to
another crunch meeting being called.
The IRA have decommissioned substantial quantities of weapons
on two occasions since 1998, but that has been too slow to assure
many Unionist voters that it is appropriate to continue to allow
Sinn Fein, the party associated with the IRA, to share Executive
power in governing Northern Ireland. Furthermore a string of activities
with known or suspected IRA involvement have further undermined
unionist confidence in the peace process. These included a trial
in Florida which revealed the procurement of guns for the IRA
after the 1998 Agreement; a break-in at Castlrereagh
Police station in Belfast in which the names and home addresses
of many Special Branch officers and informants were seized (Why
would these be wanted by the IRA if they no longer intended to
use violence against those they consider “legitimate targets”?);
the arrest of three Irishmen with IRA links suspected of training
FARC terrorists in Columbia; and the uncovering of an intelligence-gathering
operation by Sinn-Fein-related activists within government offices
at Stormont.
As the time during which complete decommissioning of weapons
did not take place by the IRA extended and the list of suspicious
activities grew, David Trimble could not anticipate surviving
yet another Ulster Unionist Council battle between pro- and anti-Agreement
factions. So, he took steps that forced the hand of the British
Secretary of State to suspend the Northern Ireland Assembly in
October 2002. That was the fourth such “temporary”
suspension since it was first elected.
This began a new round of behind-the-scenes negotiations to try
to find some means of bridging the growing divide between Unionist
and Republican positions. British Prime Minister Tony Blair pressed
Sinn Fein and the IRA for further and more substantial acts of
completion (decommissioning of weapons, etc.) and unequivocal
wording in their statement that would signal, “the war is
over.”
Elections previously scheduled for the devolved Northern Ireland
Assembly in April 2003 were postponed to May 29. Then an IRA statement
hoping to create the confidence needed for Unionist to go back
into shared government with them after those elections did not
unambiguously answer issues about continuing activity by the Republican
movement, such as so called “punishment shootings,”
exiling, targeting, and intelligence gathering. Hence, the already
once-delayed May 29th elections were postponed indefinitely. Although
the Secretary of State Paul Murphy has continued to express hopes
from May onward that elections could take place in the autumn,
it has been clear that the British government does not wish to
call them unless agreement is reached in advance, which means
that a power-sharing Executive including both Unionist and Sinn
Fein ministers can realistically be set-up after the lections.
The indefinite postponement of the elections has angered Sinn
Fein and the SDLP, who see it as a unilateral decision by the
British government to deal with internal unionist problems and
a denial of democratic rights. To a degree it has also angered
Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party because they felt
they were very likely to woo away many Ulster Unionist voters
given the level of disillusionment with the Agreement Spring 2003.
(If elections follow any behind-the-scenes resolution
of issues between Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein, Ulster Unionists
will be in a better position to hold on to their vote.) And, increasingly,
commentators across the spectrum say elections must be held this
autumn whether or not their outcome is likely to result in a power-sharing
executive being able to operate. It has now been too long since
the last elections for it to really be clear what mandate the
different parties have—even for a fresh round of negotiations.
The DUP have repeatedly said that if they receive the majority
of unionist votes they will seek to renegotiate the basis for
devolved government in Northern Ireland. However, it is very unclear
whom they imagine they will be able to find to negotiate with
them. The Belfast Agreement remains the only template for political
progress in the province and from a unionist perspective it is
likely to be as good as they can get. Republicans see the Agreement
as a transitional one en route to Irish unity. If there were to
be renegotiations they will not settle for anything less than
they got in the Belfast Agreement and are likely to push for more.
So, as the deadline for a date being set for elections this side
of Christmas approaches there have been stacks of behind-the-scenes
meetings taking place. David Trimble and Gerry Adams, leaders
of the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein respectively and who finally
shook hands for the first time in June, have met on no less that
five occasions in the past three weeks.
For its part Sinn Fein is looking for reassurances that, if fresh
elections are held for the Northern Ireland Assembly and a new
Executive is set-up, those institutions (and the North-South bodies
associated with them) will not be suspended yet again because
of internal unionist struggles. If Sinn Fein is going to be able
to bring their constituency with them in supporting purely democratic
routes, then they need to know that those democratic institutions
are stable. They also are looking for assurances that all aspects
of the Belfast Agreement will be implemented in full: They particularly
have in mind speedy demilitarization (British Army presence and
activities in Northern Ireland decreasing), further changes in
police structures and practices, and an amnesty for IRA activists
on the run.
For its part, the Ulster Unionist party is looking for reassurances
from the Republican movement (Sinn Fein and the IRA) that they
are genuinely committed to democratic politics. They want to know
that the war is over, that continuing paramilitary activity will
stop forthwith, that all IRA weapons will be verifiably put beyond
use, and that the IRA will begin to disband. Such “confidence-building
measures” would help pro-Agreement Unionists maintain their
internal majority.
During the interlude since elections were postponed and knowing
how little both sides trust each other, plans were unveiled for
a four-member commission that will monitor both the implementation
of the Agreement and paramilitary ceasefires. The commission will
comprise former U.S. intelligence chief Richard Kerr, ex-Metropolitan
Police anti-terrorist squad head John Grieve, Lord Alderdice,
who acted as Speaker in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and Joe
Brosnan, who was a senior official in the Irish justice department.
As well as scrutinizing paramilitary activity, the body will examine
the question of whether the British government is keeping to its
promises on demilitarization and whether parties in a devolved
Assembly are honoring their pledges to pursue exclusively peaceful
and democratic means.
Watch the news this week for the announcement of possible elections
at the end of November or first week in December—and for
speculation on what has been done or offered behind the scenes
to clear the way for them!
Other news
During the same time period while all of the above political maneuvering
has been talking place, a consultation process has been being
promoted by government on the future of community-relations policy
for Northern Ireland. They produced a consultation document titled
“A Shared Future: Improving Relations in Northern Ireland.”
It has sparked considerable discussion by political groups, community
organizations, and the churches. I was asked to coordinate the
planning for and facilitation of a consultation set up by the
four Church Leaders (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh, Church
of Ireland Archbishop of Armagh, Methodist Church in Ireland President
and Presbyterian Church in Ireland Moderator.) It involved just
over one hundred participants meeting for two days at Loughry
College.
One of the clear understandings emerging from the process is
that the document title has no question mark: The future here
will be shared by all sections of the community, whatever
it is. We can share our parallel funerals or we can find some
way of sharing power and responsibility. Although quite a number
in this society advocate or would settle for a kind of “benign
apartheid” in which Unionist / Protestant and Nationalist
/ Catholic sections of the society share similar rights but pretty
much live within their separate spheres, most recognize that this
simply is not possible and many believe it certainly is not desirable.
The Loughry Consultation on “The Churches’ Contribution
to improving Relations in Northern Ireland” clearly affirmed
that the only future vision worth pursing is that of a reconciled
society.
Week by week in the work that my colleagues and I undertake as
part of the Partners in Transformation Project (co-sponsored by
the Irish School of Ecumenics and Mediation Northern Ireland)
we are seeking to nurture, support, and resource the churches
in Ireland in pursuing the vision of a reconciled society. This
past week that has involved a day with first-year theological
students exploring the implications of ministry in a divided society,
a day with Church of Ireland and Roman Catholic clergy in overlapping
dioceses naming the hurts that divide their sections of the community
and seeking to identify ways of beginning to heal them, and a
day with the conveners (chairs) of key Presbyterian Church in
Ireland boards and committees looking at how we open up the theological
discussion within the denomination needed to raise the priority
given to peacebuilding.
These are exciting and challenging times. Two steps forward,
one step back; one step forward, one step sideways. The road is
not straightforward, but the journey does goes on!
Doug Baker, PC(USA) Mission Co-worker
The 2003 Mission Yearbook for Prayer & Study, p. 85
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