February 7, 2005

Northern Ireland Update

Peace comes dropping slow

The IRA has issued two hard-line statements this week that have deepened a sense of crisis in the Northern Ireland peace process. The first said it was withdrawing the offer made late in 2004 to decommission all of its weapons in return for a comprehensive political settlement. The second simply said the British and Irish governments and other parties were underestimating the seriousness of the first statement. So the question somewhere in the back of everyone’s mind is “Are we on the verge of a return to bombings and shootings?” I don’t have inside information to answer that definitively, but I tend to go along with the assessment of Northern Ireland’s Chief Constable Hugh Orde and politicians from a wide cross-section of parties, which holds that while the IRA has the weapons and skills to re-launch a bombing campaign they do not have the intent to do so. Nonetheless, if the political peace process is not over, it is at a critical moment. A recap of events may help to place the IRA statements in context.

The 1998 Belfast Agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments and ten of the political parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein. It was not signed by the IRA in its own name nor by any Loyalist paramilitary group. The Agreement outlined a process for restoring devolved regional government in Northern Ireland to replace the system of “Direct Rule” by the national parliament in Westminster that had been operating for over 25 years. Key to the Agreement was a power-sharing executive with several different parties holding ministerial positions on a proportional basis. Another part of the Agreement called for the decommissioning of weapons by all paramilitary groups within two years, a commitment on the part of those signing the Agreement to use their influence to see that this happened, and a commitment from the British government to a parallel scaling-down of military presence and other security measures.

In fact, their repeated call was for Sinn Fein to be excluded from the Executive and Assembly, in spite of their electoral mandate. The British and Irish governments never agreed to that course of action because they perceive that any lasting peace in this region requires that no section of the society feel that violence is their only avenue to influence decision-making. Hence, after every breakdown of trust and suspension of devolved regional government, the British and Irish authorities have sought ways to re-open talks with and between key parties.

Each time such negotiations have been reopened, unionist voters have tended to put pressure on their representatives to take a firmer stance and tighten language, so that they can’t be let down in the ways they believe they had been let down by Sinn Fein before. Meanwhile, Nationalist and Republican voters tended to express their annoyance with what they viewed as irrelevant or unreasonable unionist expectations. In the spring of 2004, fresh elections were held for the Northern Ireland assembly. The result was that what had been the largest party on the broad “unionist” side, the Ulster Unionist Party, was overtaken by Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party. And on the broad “nationalist side” the moderate SDLP received fewer votes than Sinn Fein. Many people thought this was a recipe for permanent impasse. However, others recognised that if these two more extreme parties could reach some form of agreement on a way to restore devolved government there was no one to outflank them, and it might actually last.

The British and Irish governments, with support from of lots of others operating behind the scene, continued to foster dialogue with the different parties and pushed hard for a new comprehensive settlement on how to implement the key components of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. This included verifiable decommissioning of IRA weapons. As the autumn of 2004 progressed, more and more comments made by different parties indicated that such a deal might actually be possible.

The Democratic Unionist Party statement in Annex E of the “Proposals by the British and Ireland Governments for a Comprehensive Agreement” actually included these words:

This community has been deeply divided and has suffered much in social and economic terms from the prolonged conflict. There is much to be done to create a society in which mutual respect for the rights and equality of all our citizens and in which mutual trust can grow. There is a need to build a calm regard for our distinct and sometimes conflicting cultural traditions and to respect the diversity of our people.

Such language from the DUP surprised many. It indicates a considerable journey from statements made a year—let alone ten years—earlier!

Sinn Fein, for its part, made a number of statements that came closer to saying “The war is over” than they had ever made before. As well, they made it clear that they could see a prospect for the IRA not only decommissioning its weapons but also standing down its members. Then, amazingly, as the negotiations neared the end, the IRA offered to decommission all of its weapons by the end of the year in response to a comprehensive settlement.

The choreographers began to work on the steps of who would do what first and how that would free someone else to make another move, and how no one could be wrong-footed by the others not fulfilling their side of any agreement. And hope, never terribly strong in much of the general population during this latest round of talks, began to lift its head slowly, tentatively. Christmas was just around the corner, and perhaps this would really be the year when the message of peace rang loud and true in this place. But the mood returned to “bleak mid-winter” all too abruptly.

Although the talks did not include any official face-to-face meetings between Sinn Fein and the DUP, they had progressed far enough that there was discussion about how to credibly verify the decommissioning of IRA weapons. This included proposals to have at least one local Protestant minister and one local Catholic priest present along with the international monitors who had witnessed earlier acts of IRA decommissioning. The talks eventually collapsed, however, over this question of credible verification. In the end it all turned on the question of a photograph. The DUP insisted that the handing over of IRA arms be visually documented by photographs. While that demand was being pressed Ian Paisley also made a public comment about it being appropriate for the IRA to wear “sackcloth and ashes” to indicate that its renunciation of violence as a political tool and its remorse for the suffering caused are genuine. The most favourable reading of the DUP demand for a photograph is that it was intended to provide sufficient proof to their sceptical supporters that any IRA act of decommissioning was both genuine and substantial. The more negative reading of it was that the DUP wanted the IRA to be publicly humiliated, its weaponlessness (nakedness) exposed for all to see.

That demand was too much for the IRA to agree to. To them it did smack of humiliation or surrender, rather than the putting away of what is no longer needed. Hence, they made it clear that photographic documentation was out of the question. A different kind of all-too-familiar choreography then followed. The IRA had said the very thing the DUP demanded was impossible. In response the DUP emphatically signalled that the thing that IRA had said could not be delivered was the very thing which absolutely would have to be delivered or the whole deal was impossible. The chorus line of hope slowly retreated and a circle dance began with each party pointing blame at the other.

The next movement was analysis. Had either party really intended to make a deal? The DUP had sounded more reasonable that many had believed possible, but surely they were bright enough to know that Sin Fein and the IRA would never agree to what they were requiring. By setting the bar as high as they did for their enemies had they guaranteed that they would not have to live up to the offers they have made themselves? And the IRA must have known early on that photographic evidence would be asked for, so had they offered something that looked good but, because it was still short of what they knew their enemies required, wouldn’t actually be required of them either? Who was bluffing whom in this process? Having moved so close to a deal, did either actually ever intend to make it? Or had the movement on both sides really been significant and was it all squandered because of some unhelpful comments that snapped a still fragile bridge being constructed?

While speculation on those questions and efforts to find some way to rescue the talks were still underway a new development shook the whole peace process to its core. On the evening of December 20 a gang stole £26.5 million pounds ($53 million) from the Northern Bank premises in Belfast city centre. While no one has yet been apprehended for this crime and no money recovered, within days whatever evidence and intelligence the investigation had to go on pointed to it being carried out by the Provisional IRA. The assumption has also been made that planning such a sophisticated heist had to have had knowledge and authorisation from the highest levels within the IRA. Since then, both Sinn Fein politicians and the IRA have repeatedly made statements denying any IRA involvement in the heist. Their view is that it was carried out by sinister elements of the security forces in an attempt to make the IRA look bad. My own suspiciousness about what has and still happens in a “dirty war” such as the Northern Irish conflict would have been sufficient for my own mind to speculate about such possibilities when news of the robbery first broke. However, what has been interesting in this case is that virtually no one outside senior IRA and Sinn Fein leadership has any doubt that the IRA did it. The Irish government, relying on their own Garda (police) intelligence, has drawn the same conclusions as the British Government. And those I interact with who live or work in Nationalist/Republican areas of Northern Ireland all would say that neither they nor many individuals they come across on the streets have any doubts that the IRA did it.

Where speculation does differ is around why the IRA did it. Many simply believe that they are building up a sort of pension plan. If the war is over there are “volunteers” to be paid off as they are stood down. They have been implicated in other big robberies in recent years. They simply got lucky and ended up with a bigger haul than they anticipated on this occasion. Others wonder if it was a direct reaction to the breakdown of the autumn negotiations on what they saw as an attempt to humiliate the IRA. In this scenario the view is that the IRA were saying “Now look who has been humiliated!” Some see it as a kind of post 9/11 “Canary Wharf.” (A massive bombing at Canary Wharf in London in 1995 signalled the end of the first IRA ceasefire. Post 9/11 there is much lower tolerance for such attacks by those who might otherwise support Sinn Fein, so the robbery might have been a different kind of blow to the British economy that signalled the IRA are still a force with which to be reckoned.) Perhaps most perceive it simply as an example of IRA arrogance that legitimates criminality behind a political cause. In the worldview of the IRA they are the only legitimate army or government in Ireland and the ends they are pursuing justify means such as this.

Whether or not convictions will ever prove that the IRA did it and no matter what their reasoning for pulling off such a heist might have been, the political fall-out from presumed IRA responsibility for it has been enormous. For years the demand many others have been making is that, before they can be included in any form of power-sharing government, the Republican movement (Sinn Fein and the IRA) must demonstrate a genuine commitment to purely non-violent democratic politics by not only holding to their cease-fire but also stopping all forms of punishment beatings, intimidation, and targeting of potential victims. There is strong anger that the IRA would have sanctioned this heist as being somehow “legitimate” in their overall strategy. As a result, the bar, in terms of what is the minimum required from the Republican movement, has now been raised by other parties essential to any lasting settlement. And so, to the previous list “ending involvement in any form of criminality” has now been added.

There is also a deep erosion of trust arising out of this incident. In a newspaper commentary Brian Feeney, a former SDLP politician, said that given all of the factors that point to the IRA being responsible, there are only two conclusions that can be drawn about the Sinn Fein leadership that had been engaged in the negotiations in the autumn. Either, that at the same time they were involved in negotiations they were aware that such an operation was being planned and, therefore, were negotiating in bad faith; or, that they genuinely did not know what the IRA was up to at that point and the whole episode shows that those Sinn Fein politicians were never in a position to be negotiating on behalf of the Republican movement. He goes on to say that both scenarios are very serious. Either these guys’ word can’t be trusted, or it is worthless, since they really aren’t in control of key decision-making within the Republican movement.

As we move beyond this incident Unionists are now stepping up demands for the government to press ahead and restore a devolved administration in Northern Ireland without Sinn Féin. Sinn Fein continues to stridently deny any IRA connection with the bank robbery and blames the British and Irish governments for making a mess of the peace process. And the IRA has issued these two statements saying that what they had been prepared to offer is off the table and that the stakes at the moment are very high.

There is obviously a not too veiled threat in their statements, but they also know that when this blows over some kind of talks will have to take place again and, whether others like it or not, participation of Sinn Fein in the structures of government in Northern Ireland will have to be part of the political equation. The IRA may have annoyed a lot of people and are venting their own annoyance, but they have not given up their weapons, stood down their members, or made any pledges to end their participation in criminality. It is important to remember that they tend to take a long view of politics. No talks are likely to get going again until after general elections later this year in both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. When talks do start again the bar Sinn Fein will be expected to reach before sharing power will be higher, but they also still have a lot with which to bargain.

Everything that I have said up until now has to do with the peace process in terms of official political negotiations. It needs to be remembered that there is also a wider peace process—relationship building across lines of religious and political difference, structured and unstructured dialogue being fostered through all kinds of initiatives. Because the official political peace process has run into serious difficulties, it becomes even more important that the wider peace process is stepped up. In various ways this is happening and PC(USA) mission activities here are part of that wider process.

“Peace comes dropping slow” is a line first penned a century ago in a poem by Ireland’s William Butler Yeats. It could just as easily be a headline looking back over 2004 or even a commentary written about the ten years that have passed since the IRA and Loyalist cease-fires in 1994. It is easy to become discouraged. However, we are called to be faithful to the vision of peace we believe God intends for this place and then do what we can to live into that vision.

Prayer requests

At this critical time, please

• Pray that political leaders in Ireland and Britain will have the wisdom and courage to continue to pursue the things that make for peace, in spite of recent setbacks.
• Pray that those who out of frustration may be tempted to resort to violence will instead be given the imagination and determination to pursue creative ways of reducing tension.
• Pray that those who feel their efforts in relationships building make little difference in the face of breakdown in bigger processes may be reminded of God’s power at work through them to accomplish far more than they can ever imagine.

Doug Baker
PC(USA) Mission Co-Worker, Northern Ireland

The 2005 Mission Yearbook for Prayer & Study, p. 174