June 22, 2006

Open for Business? Northern Ireland Assembly Reconvened

On May 15th the Northern Ireland Assembly reconvened, with one major agenda item—finding some agreement on re-establishing a power-sharing Executive in order for certain functions of government to once again be devolved from the United Kingdom parliament in Westminster to a regional body for Northern Ireland. But to date there has been virtually no progress and very few actual meetings.

Historical Background:

(Note: Those familiar with Irish political history over the past two centuries and the details of ‘Direct Rule’ and the 1998 arrangements for the Northern Ireland Assembly may want to skip down to the bold heading Recent Impasse. For those who may find it necessary/helpful to have a more detailed background description, read on.)

From approximately 1800 onwards, the whole island of Ireland had been incorporated into ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.’ During the 19th and early 20th centuries there were various campaigns and rebellions seeking to make Ireland independent from Britain—or at least achieve a degree of self-rule over internal affairs. Early in the 20th century when sentiment for such “Home Rule” was growing, a counter movement developed amongst the descendents of Protestant Scottish and English settlers, who feared “Home Rule will be Rome Rule.” So long as the island remained an integral part of the larger Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, these folk were part of the British and Protestant majority on the two islands. However, they would become a minority in any independent Ireland. Therefore they opposed independence and favored ‘union’ with Britain—and were at that time prepared to resort to armed force to maintain it. Politically they have been known as ‘unionists’ ever since.

In spite of this unionist resistance, ‘nationalists’ (largely both longer-term residents in Ireland and Catholic by religious tradition) continued to press for independence, including by armed force in the Easter Rising of 1916 and the campaign against British forces in Ireland in the years following.

The “solution” arrived at by the powers that be was to partition Ireland. Those counties with a nationalist majority wanting to move toward independence were allowed to do so and a parliament was eventually established in Dublin for 26 of the counties.  It evolved into a totally independent nation and sovereign government. The six ‘counties’ with a unionist majority wishing to remain part of The United Kingdom were allowed to do so and in 1920 Northern Ireland as a new political entity was created.. The United Kingdom officially became ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,’ and a new regional parliament was set up in Belfast to exercise internal rule—in much the same way that a state legislature might operate in the United States. A new parliament building was constructed at Stormont. Hence reference to the seat of Northern Ireland government is generally shortened to Stormont. At the time of partition in 1920, the population of the six counties that became Northern Ireland was approximately 70 percent unionist and 30 percent nationalist and—since these political factions largely corresponded to the different ethnic groups with their different geographic origins, cultural backgrounds and religious heritage—the denominational division between Protestant and Catholic was roughly the same.

From 1920 onwards every election to the Northern Ireland (Stormont) Parliament was contested largely on how candidates stood on one question—whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom (the unionist position ) or whether it should be joined to the Republic of Ireland and be independent of any British political control (the nationalist position.) However, although the key political issue was one of nationalism (which nation to belong to,) since political parties and their supporters were largely divided along ethnic and religious lines there was almost no swing vote. As a result the unionists had control of the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont from 1920 to 1972 and nationalists were always a minority who felt unable to exercise any real influence or prevent decisions being made and implemented—to the advantage of the unionist population and to their own detriment.

By the late 1960s the balance between these two ethnic/political groups had changed to roughly 60 percent/40 percent. Pressure by nationalists and their supporters for greater evenhandedness in how internal affairs in Northern Ireland were handled were met with a backlash by hard-line unionists. This reinforced the view of more extreme nationalists (republicans) that force was the only way to affect change. The period of civil strife, referred to as ‘The Troubles,’ erupted.

As violence increased the United Kingdom government at Westminster had to send in more troops and give more attention to Northern Ireland issues than they had often done in the years since 1920. One thing which soon became clear was that a unionist-controlled regional government at Stormont simply could not deal with sensitive matters of security in relation to the civil strife nor could it effectively govern a polarized society in which perhaps 40 percent of the population felt alienated from it and unwilling to give it their backing. Therefore in 1972 the UK national (Westminster) parliament suspended the Northern Ireland regional parliament (Stormont.) A Secretary of State and other deputy Ministers from elsewhere in the United Kingdom were appointed to take over the duties of the former Stormont Prime Minister and his cabinet. Thus began a long period known as Direct Rule. (Instead of internal affairs of Northern Ireland being devolved to a regional elected parliament, they are administered directly by the national parliament through a Secretary of State and other ministers - not elected by the citizens of Northern Ireland.) When instituted in 1972 this was viewed as a ‘temporary’ measure. It has always been every party’s second choice rather than their preferred option for governing Northern Ireland. But, as there has not been any outright victory by any faction—enabling them to impose their preferred choice—nor any convergence of factions around some better way, Direct Rule has remained the default option.

A major strand of British policy for the 34 years since then has been to find a way to devolve—at least limited-authority and responsibility to an elected body in Northern Ireland once again. However, it has been clear that this could not simply be a return to the kind of regional parliament which had existed before—controlled by and having the loyalty of only one ethnic/political power-block. To be effective and stable it would need to have at least some degree of backing from both sections of the community and both groups would need to feel it is at least somewhat effective in meeting their needs. Following the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974 there was a brief experiment with a “power sharing” Executive at Stormont, in which for the first time there were some ministers presenting moderate nationalism sitting alongside a majority of unionist ministers. It was a step too far for more hard-line unionists and not at all far enough to satisfy those from an Irish republican perspective. After only a few weeks it was brought down by a worker’s strike enforced by hard-line unionist paramilitaries.

Negotiations since 1974 involving the British and Irish governments and political parties in Northern Ireland have, in part, focused on how to resolve the question of whether or not the border created in 1920 with the partition of Ireland should remain or go, and in part how to find a formula for setting up some regional elected body in Northern Ireland—broadly acceptable to both unionists and nationalists—to which power and responsibility might once again be devolved for as long as Northern Ireland remains a part of the United Kingdom (whether that be for a short period or permanently.) The Belfast Agreement, signed by the two governments and most of the political parties in Northern Ireland on Good Friday 1998 and ratified in referenda by citizens in both parts of the island, contains detailed arrangements for such a body.

A Northern Ireland Assembly elected on a basis of proportional representation to try to ensure that candidates representing both moderate and more extreme expressions of unionism and nationalism would be elected; operating under a power-sharing executive, with a First Minister from the party with the largest number of seats and a Deputy First Minister from the party with the second largest number of seats (presumably one unionist and one nationalist) and other Ministerial posts within the Executive allocated to these and other parties in proportion to the number of seats they hold in the Assembly: and requiring that business approved has to have support from both a majority of unionist and a majority of nationalist members

Such an Assembly and Executive would address the peculiar difficulties of providing stability in administering and securing the loyalty of a politically polarized society. It also is heavily dependent on trust existing between different parties and a willingness to pursue the common good rather than narrow personal interest. A short supply of both of those meant that it took from 1998 to 2001 for further negotiations before the power-sharing Executive provided for could be formed and begin to function. Since then trust between the parties represented in it has deteriorated so badly that on four separate occasions the Executive and Assembly has had to be suspended and ‘Direct Rule’ resumed. Each time the governments and parties carried on further negotiations both behind the scenes and, on occasion, in highly publicized gatherings. After the first three suspensions movement on the part of one or more of the groups in negotiations or action by the armed faction with which they are aligned, distancing them from the use of force for political purposes, paved the way for the Assembly to resume meeting and the Executive to function once again. However, in 2003 there was a much more critical collapse.

Recent Impasse

The last time the Assembly met was just over three and one-half years ago. Revelations and rumors about the IRA’s continuing involvement in gathering intelligence information about and targeting individuals for possible attack led to a further deterioration in trust at that time and a refusal on the part of the Ulster Unionist Party to share power in an Executive with Sinn Fein members. Without a functioning Executive the Secretary of State suspended the Assembly once again.

In May 2003, scheduled elections for the Assembly saw a substantial shift in power. On the unionist side the Democratic Unionist Party overtook the Ulster Unionists and claimed the largest block of seats. On the nationalist side Sinn Fein outpaced the SDLP and ended up with the second highest numbers of seats out of all parties. According to the formula for a power-sharing executive in the 1998 Belfast Agreement those results would have entitled the DUP to the First Minister’s post and Sinn Fein to the Deputy First Minister’s post. But the DUP had campaigned on a manifesto of not allowing Sinn Fein to enter government without further demonstrations by the IRA that the war is over and they are committed to pursuing their aspirations in the future through only peaceful means. In the intervening three and one-half years there has been major decommissioning of the IRA’s arms and a number of comments by Sinn Fein leaders along the lines of what the DUP and other parties have sought. However, as far as the DUP is concerned, with the majority of unionist voters backing them, these actions and comments have not been enough to have those they still view as ‘unrepentant and unreconstructed terrorists’ sharing in government. Hence, the DUP has resisted any efforts to reconvene the Assembly and elect a new Executive.

However, frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations outside the Assembly to find a way through this logjam eventually led the British Government in Westminster to introduce special legislation allowing Secretary of Sate Peter Hain to reconvene the Assembly under special operating orders for two periods of up to six weeks each—one before the summer and one after it. (The length of time for each sitting relates to a provision in the 1998 Belfast Agreement which gives the Assembly a period of six weeks after convening to elect an Executive or be dissolved and new elections called in the hope that the electorate, believing that having a regional assembly accountable to them and with powers to make decisions on some matters devolved to it is a better option than ‘Direct Rule,’ would not simply return the same politicians once again but rather elect ones who would be prepared to work together.)

The arrangement made it clear that the main item of business for the Assembly during these sessions would be to elect an Executive. If that was done and the Executive actually began working the Assembly would continue beyond the six-week limit and gradually deal with other business. If no Executive was elected the Assembly would once again be suspended before the end of the six-week period, allowing for more time for behind the scenes negotiations over the summer—but not requiring a new election. It would then be reconvened in the autumn and be able to use a further six-week period to try to get an Executive up and running. However, if after two goes of this that task was not accomplished, the Assembly would not only be suspended—as had happened on previous occasions—but its members would have their salaries stopped, no new elections would be held and instead of reverting to a kind of ‘Direct Rule’ in which UK ministers do the minimum required with regard to decision-making on internal Northern Ireland affairs, the British and Irish governments would move to a more active form of cooperation in administering Northern Ireland affairs, which might well include some harsh decisions on local services and other matters with significant financial consequences. The governments have set November 24 as a deadline. The challenge made to the parties with representatives at Stormont is find a way of cooperating by then or face the consequences of us implementing decisions and policies you may well not have chosen had you been functioning.

The Hain Assembly

Because of the special arrangements under which it is operating and the extraordinary power remaining with the Secretary of State Peter Hain, the special session of the Northern Ireland Assembly which began on May 15 has been dubbed ‘The Hain Assembly.” Since the last session, the previous Speaker, John Alderdice, had been appointed to the International Monitoring Commission and so had stood down as Speaker. Hain appointed Eileen Bell from the Alliance Party as his successor. The Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) elected in 2003 had not even been formally registered, so that had to be done when the Assembly reopened on May 15.

The fact that the first action of the Assembly was to observe a minute of silence for 15-year-old schoolboy Michael McIlveen, who had been beaten to death in a sectarian attack by other youth in Ballymena the previous week, was a poignant reminder that sectarian attitudes and violence continue to bring heartache to this land years after the ceasefires and the Belfast Agreement.

From there the expected script was followed. The first item of business was to elect a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister. Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, proposed the DUP leader Ian Paisley as First Minister and Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister. Ian Paisley declined rather than go into government with Sinn Fein and the formal attempt at electing an Executive was over.

As a way around this Hain agreed to establish a 14-member Preparation for Government Committee tasked with identifying the issues blocking a return to devolution. However, further controversy meant that it could not get past the starting block. Both the DUP and SF blocked attempts to appoint a chair. The controversy has not simply been about personalities but also about the functioning of the committee itself. The DUP has insists that the committee will not be involved in any negotiations on those issues. And, whereas SF wants the committee to push for the restoration of the institutions as set out in the Belfast Agreement, the DUP wants a thorough review of them. Speaker Eileen Bell refused to become chair because she saw a clash with her neutrality as chair. The DUP representative would not accept the notion of a rotating chair between the parties, because it could not stomach Sinn Fein having a turn. The cross-community Alliance party chose not to supply a chair as a way of letting the others off the hook in terms of some movement toward power-sharing. Eventually Secretary of State Peter Hain had to make his own appointments, with DUP and SF co-chairs. The hope has been that the British and Irish government leaders, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, will appear in Belfast on June 29 to make a major speech picking up on the progress arising out of the work of this committee and then moving into further negotiations over the summer. However, it waits to be seen whether there will be any progress and any point to them coming.

There is also an all-party business committee which has been urging Mr. Hain to allow the Assembly to debate a range of issues. But the Assembly meets only when Hain allows it to do so, and only for business he approves. SF refuses to take part in debates it regards as a distraction from the main business of electing a power-sharing Executive. Nearly all of the six-week period allotted to it for work before a summer recess has been used up.

One other significant development emerged when the Assembly convened, which has made progress toward the election of an executive even more unlikely at present. In a tactical move the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party had approached David Ervine, the only MLA from the Progressive Unionist Party, to get him to commit to vote with their block in the Assembly. Since the ministerial posts in a power-sharing Executive are doled out  in proportion to the number of seats each party has in its voting block the effect of this would be to give the Ulster Unionists one more post and Sinn Fein one less post if and when an executive is appointed.  However, the move has caused outrage both within and outside the UUP. The PUP is closely aligned to the Loyalist paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force. The UVF is not recognized by the Secretary of State as being on cease-fire. Many UUP members find it completely unacceptable that their leader Sir Reg Empey has aligned them with the PUP. The only remaining UUP Westminster MP, Lady Sylvia Hermon, has expressed her disapproval. A few UUP MLAs and district councilors have already resigned and joined either the Alliance party or the NI branch of the Conservative party. As well, the DUP believing that those aligned with terrorism of any sort no right to be in government has threatened not to share power with the UUP in any Executive. Has the UUP who lost many of their voters in the last election shot itself in the other foot?

Not many people had high hopes about the return of the Assembly bringing a quick resolution to the long-running political stalemate, but the failure to even get a committee on devolution functioning has made any movement look even more unlikely. If the visit of Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern scheduled for the end of June is abandoned and the Assembly might not even be reconvened before the November 24 deadline, direct rule could be firmly embedded for the foreseeable future.

On a positive note: Any good news coming out of Northern Ireland?

After all of that it would not be unreasonably for anyone with the slightest interest in the wellbeing of this place to be depressed. But running alongside it there are other more positive stories to report.

As has so often happened in the past, the tragic sectarian murder of Michael McIlveen has shocked the local community in Ballymena into some creative responses. New work is taking place within and between schools in the town to challenge sectarian attitudes and violence and some local church leaders went out of their way to cross barriers in the wake of the killing—regardless of whether or not all of those from their own churches would understand or support their actions.

In the recent annual elections of mayors, two unionist-dominated district councils that had never before had a nationalist mayor elected one. Another overwhelmingly nationalist district council elected its first ever DUP mayor.

Months of behind the scenes efforts led last week to a local agreement and compromise between factions in North Belfast enabling the contentious Orange Order ‘Tour of the North’ parade to pass off without any confrontations—a good omen for the marching season just getting under way. However, the real test may come on June 24 when the Whiterock parade is scheduled to take place.

The All Ireland Special Olympics began in Belfast June 21 with thousands of athletes, families, supporters, and volunteers from all parts of Ireland and all religious and political backgrounds drawn together for a common purpose.

Finally, I met today with six peacemaking staff recently appointed by the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, The Church of Ireland (Episcopal), Edgehill Theological College of the Methodist Church in Ireland, and the Roman Catholic Redemptorist order—all have the task to help their respective denominations engage more fully in peacemaking as an integral part of their witness to the good news of Jesus Christ. We shared hopes, plans, challenges, insights, and ways in which our faith is sustaining us in this particular calling. One of my roles over the next year will be to convene and resource this group as individually and together we seek to live faithfully as peacemakers.

Rev Doug Baker
(PC)USA Regional Liaison for Ireland and the United Kingdom

The 2006 Mission Yearbook for Prayer & Study, p. 175