December 2006

Northern Ireland update

Here's an update on the current political peace process in Northern Ireland. Apologies for making it so long, but virtually every day there are new twists and turns and even a bare-bones account is lengthy. We've already written a newsletter this month with a story about two brave peacemakers in Northern Ireland.

Inching toward devolution?

For well over a decade, the goal toward which the British and Irish governments have been working in relation to Northern Ireland as at least a medium-term “solution” is the restoration of devolved government, in which the key Northern Ireland parties representing both Unionist and Nationalist voters are prepared to share power and responsibility for internal affairs. (See my June 2006 update for a detailed historical explanation of “direct rule” and “devolution.”) The 1998 Belfast Agreement was meant to have established both the framework and the inter-party trust that would enable this to happen. However, in the years since both have been found wanting. Whenever power-sharing at Executive level between ministers from local parties collapsed, all Executive power returned to the secretary of state and other direct rule ministers appointed by the national U.K. Parliament in Westminster. Whenever efforts to restore power sharing between Unionist and Nationalist ministers in the Executive met with no success, the whole Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended. Assembly members continued to receive their salaries but they did not meet to deliberate or vote on any legislative matters.

From 2001 to 2005 various high-publicity meetings convened by the British and Irish governments and many more behind the scenes initiatives sought without success to find some formula to address the concerns of different parties. After what had appeared to be promising talks in December 2005 failed to break the impasse, the patience of many citizens in Northern Ireland and of the British and Irish governments had been stretched about as far as possible. Therefore, early in 2006 the British secretary of state and the prime ministers of Britain and Ireland set a deadline for the Northern Ireland political parties: Find agreement by November 24 or the suspended Assembly will simply be wound up, its members salaries stopped, and further efforts to restore devolution shelved for several years.

It was also made clear that if the deadline were not met, direct rule ministers would make several significant decisions about internal matters in Northern Ireland that they had been holding off making in the hope that members of a functioning Assembly in Northern Ireland could debate and make themselves. Implied in the last part of the ultimatum was “and you quite possibly won’t be happy with the decisions we take, but you will just have to lump that if you can’t get your act together by then to make them yourselves.”

On several occasions over the past decade deadlines had been set and then relaxed when it was clear that negotiations between the parties were not going to reach agreement in time. Therefore, to focus minds time and again Secretary of State Peter Hain and Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasized that November 24 was a real deadline.

Over the summer and into the autumn lots of debate took place within parties to see what movement they could contemplate and what was unacceptable to their constituencies. Lots of meetings also took place between individual parties and the British or Irish governments to set out their concerns. A much smaller number of meetings took place between Northern Ireland parties trying to understand each other’s concerns or make themselves understood. Although the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended, a special “Preparation for Government Committee” with Assembly members from all parties was set up by the secretary of state for the purpose of parties exploring with each other what obstacles would need to be overcome before a new agreement could be reached on power sharing.

Eventually, in October, the British and Irish prime ministers convened a “make or break” meeting for high-level delegations of all of the parties with members in the Northern Ireland Assembly. It was held in St Andrews, Scotland. Some of the smaller parties have various concerns with the 1998 Belfast Agreement and how it has or hasn’t been implemented which they want addressed, and which they brought to that meeting. However, the two biggest parties each came with a major demand of the other which they held would have to be met. Both parties were conscious of a major change in policy that they would have to sell to their constituency if the impasse was to be broken.

The Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) main demand was that Sinn Fein unambiguously express its support for the rule of law in Northern Ireland before they were given any part in a power-sharing Executive. For them this includes Sinn Fein taking up the places they have so far left vacant on the Policing Board, encouraging their constituency to work in cooperation with the police and courts, and encouraging members of their constituency to join the restructured Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

The main Sinn Fein demand was for the Democratic Unionist Party to unambiguously declare its willingness to share power with Republicans (Sinn Fein) on the basis of the Sinn Fein electoral mandate, not on the basis of Sinn Fein taking further steps to endorse the police and criminal justice system to satisfy DUP demands.

The major changes in policy that each would have to sell to their constituency are really the flip side of the other’s demand.

The DUP had stood for election on a manifesto promising not to go into power-sharing with Republicans (Sinn Fein) unless they had completely renounced any use of violence to pursue their political goals and signed up to support the policing and criminal justice systems in Northern Ireland. Could they then dare agree to participate in power sharing without sufficient action from Sinn Fein to satisfy their DUP voters or without firm commitments from the British and Irish governments to hold Sinn Fein to any promises they might make?

For Sinn Fein, the change in policy they would have to sell to their constituency is support for policing and other aspect of the criminal justice system. (Sinn Fein is the only party in the Assembly to have withheld its support for the PSNI, insisting that nationalists are not yet convinced police reforms go far enough and that the days of political policing are over.) Could they take such a step without first getting further changes in policing and firm commitments from the British and Irish governments to greater North-South cooperation that the DUP could not overrule or make unworkable? In particular, they wanted a clear and firm commitment on the timing and nature of transfer of responsibility for policing and justice matters to a Northern Ireland Executive.

After two days when the Northern Ireland parties were not able to arrive at any agreement on how to break the impasse, the British and Irish governments put forward their own proposals with their best understanding of what would be required all around and with a choreography for movement forward that would give cover to each major party where they might be vulnerable with their own constituencies. The process outlined by Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern could lead to power sharing by the end of March 2007. Initial responses to this gave some hope that both the DUP and Sinn Fein were ready to do business.

Within days, however, hardliners within each party’s constituency were finding aspects of the proposals that they could not stomach and demanding that their party leaders not proceed without action by the other party first. Meetings that had been planned as part of the careful choreography outlined at St Andrews came and went without either of the parties showing up, or they were simply cancelled because one of the parties indicated they would not come. Even the deadline by which parties were to give their formal responses on the St Andrews proposals was fudged. Both parties gave very limited and qualified replies to the effect that the other part would have to do a number of things before they could embrace the proposals with any enthusiasm.

In the face of the fact that some of the preliminary meetings called for in the St Andrews proposals had not taken place and of ambiguous responses to the proposals by the parties—and in spite of the hard stance taken about deadlines in the months leading up to St Andrews—the British and Irish governments keep lowering the bar as to what they require in order to proceed. It had originally seemed that the two big parties would have to indicate that they would share power in March 2007 by formally nominating Ian Paisley (DUP) for first minister and Martin McGuinness (SF) for deputy first minister at a special sitting of the re-convened Assembly on November 24. In accepting the nominations, both would then have had to swear oaths stating that they would agree to operate power sharing, including giving support to north-south cooperative bodies, and that they would uphold the rule of law in Northern Ireland (support policing and the justice system.)

However, Sinn Fein argued that they could only endorse policing after they had called a formal Ard Fheis (party conference) and that it could not take place before November 24. Furthermore, they argued that the oath should only be sworn when the new first minister and deputy first minister were actually taking up office in March 2007. The DUP were having nothing to do with that logic and argued that they would only make their nomination after Sinn Fein had publicly endorsed policing. As the days leading up to November 24 passed, some DUP officials went further and said that there would need to be a British government guarantee that Sinn Fein would have no part to play in devolved responsibility for policing and justice for some considerable period, until they had truly demonstrated that they could be trusted with it. Some figures talked about “not in several political lifetimes” (a reference to five-year terms of office for members of the legislative assembly). That did nothing to encourage Sinn Fein to go public in its support for policing.

Nonetheless, wanting this roadmap to proceed, the British government rushed legislation through Parliament to be able to implement the St Andrews Agreement when parties made those nominations. The legislation provides for “a transitional Assembly” to meet to receive the nominations and do other work in preparation for renewed power sharing before being dismissed in January. Then there will be elections on March 7 for a new Assembly, thereby allowing the DUP in particular to stand under a revised manifesto and the big parties, they hope, to further consolidate their numbers.

The stage was then set for Friday November 24 to be a momentous breakthrough, with either the key nominations being made or a clear indication that the devolution train was off the tracks. Instead, there was confusion about what was said inside the chamber and chaos outside the chamber. Gerry Adams, of Sinn Fein, nominated Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness for the first and deputy first minister positions. Martin McGuinness basically indicated that he would be willing to accept the nomination and take the required oath come March 26, but only if further issues about policing and the structures for oversight of policing and justice were dealt with by the British government in the meantime. Then, instead of making a similar double nomination, Ian Paisley indicated that he was open to accepting a nomination for first minister in March, if conditions were right by then to proceed toward power sharing—but that Sinn Fein had much to do before the conditions would be right and such nominations could be made. The speaker of the assembly took that as a concurrence with his nomination, but members of the DUP instantly questioned whether that was what he had actually said. At that point, the Assembly chamber had to evacuated because Michael Stone, a notorious Loyalist killer released from prison under the “early release” scheme of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, had been apprehended entering the Stormont Assembly Building with a gun and a number of explosive devices. (While this was most likely in part a personal publicity stunt, his comments caught on camera make it clear that he was trying to launch an attack on Sinn Fein leaders and also prevent the DUP from moving forward on a compromise he could not endorse.)

In the chaos outside twelve DUP Assembly members issued a statement indicating that Ian Paisley had not placed himself in nomination or accepted any other nomination of him. Later the official DUP press office gave a differing account of what had happened. Meanwhile the British government accepted the less-than-clear nominations and acceptance as sufficient to keep the process moving forward and caved in on their November 24 deadline for “agreement.”

Since then, there have been various interviews showing that there are serious debates within the DUP on the way forward and that Ian Paisley has had to face down opposition from a number of his party colleagues. There have also been further comments from various DUP leaders about what Sinn Fein has to do and prove before it could be possible to allow them into any power sharing arrangement that includes oversight of policing and justice. All of this makes it seem very unlikely that either party is prepared to do enough before March elections to obtain from the other the confidence that is lacking or that there is anything like enough time for Sinn Fein to conceivably do what the DUP seems to require of them.

Two other things have occurred around these latest steps in this process. The first is that there have been a number of fire bombings of commercial premises by dissident Republican splinter groups unhappy with the direction being taken by Sinn Fein. These have caused millions of pounds in damage and put hundreds of jobs in jeopardy. Security intelligence groups fear that the dissident Republicans are also seeking an opportunity to carry out more serious bombings to try to destabilize the process. So Sinn Fein is being serious when they talk about the need to bring their constituency along with them and the difficulties they face in doing so. The second is that there have been cracks appearing in the DUP and the Free Presbyterian Church, of which Ian Paisley is also the leader. Quite a few elected officials in the DUP have indicated that they are not happy with the St Andrews agreement and don’t approve of the DUP moving forward on the basis of it. Some Free Presbyterian ministers have also indicated that they do not approve of what their moderator, Ian Paisley, is doing with his political hat on, indicating again that there are constituencies that even the dominating figure of Ian Paisley cannot take for granted will follow his lead.

The path to devolution in Northern Ireland remains as complicated as ever, and the March 26 goal for a new Assembly with devolved responsibility unde3r a power sharing arrangement quite unlikely. Nonetheless this is the path that both governments are continuing to pursue, because as they have admitted themselves there is no Plan B. After perhaps 15 years of round after round of talks, it remains their best understanding of the most likely option to meet the diverse needs and interests of all of the parties concerned. And so Northern Ireland inches toward it, and sometimes away from it, but the journey goes on, and the level of violence on the streets remains low.

To finish on a more positive note, the price of petrol (gasoline) has dramatically dropped over the last three months from $8.50 per gallon to $7.40.

Rev Doug Baker
PC(USA) Regional Liaison for Ireland and the UK

The 2006 Mission Yearbook for Prayer & Study, p. 175

We now have an over-the-Internet telephone line with a virtual number in the United States, which allows churches in the United States to phone us without paying international rates. It is (502) 413-6165. If you use it, please remember that we are five hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time and eight hours ahead of Pacific Time.

How to support us

While we personally are still strong believers in the importance of keeping up “undesignated giving” to support all General Assembly mission, the reality is that congregations and individuals increasingly wish to direct some of their GA giving to specific personnel or projects, and we are also being asked to secure more of our basic support from such gifts.

Direct Mission Support

Many congregations choose to direct a portion of their mission offerings toward one or more mission worker of our denomination as a way to interpret the use of the congregation’s mission dollars or perhaps to support particular areas of mission they care about deeply, while also contributing to the whole mission effort of the PC(USA). As mission personnel, we are also now being asked to take a greater role in encouraging you to contribute to our support.

Some of you receiving this letter already designate toward our salary and other basic support costs. We are grateful for this and ask that you try to increase the amount each year, at least to keep up with inflation.

Individuals may send checks to:

PC(USA)
Individual Remittance Processing
P.O. Box 643700
Pittsburgh, PA 15264-3700

Churches can send checks to their normal receiving site or:

PC(USA)
Church Remittance Processing
P.O. Box 643678
Pittsburgh, PA 15264-3789

Contributors should take care to put our name and DMS number, D500260, on the subject line of the check. Restricted or designated giving is subject to equalization at all levels and is a part of the PC(USA). For more information contact: Judy Pearson. Download a pledge form.

Extra Commitment Opportunities

For congregations or individuals who wish to support our ministry with financial gifts beyond salary and other basic support costs, a special ECO account has been established. These funds are used (1) for operating and administrative expenses of the regional liaison in helping implement programs with partner churches and institutions (2) for supporting PC(USA) congregations and presbyteries in direct mission involvement with partners, and (3) for giving practical, pastoral, and culture transition support to other PC(USA) mission personnel serving in the region.

Contributions from individuals may be sent to Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Individual Remittance Processing, PO Box 643700, Pittsburgh, PA 15264-3700. Contributions from churches should be sent to: Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Church Remittance Processing, PO Box 643678, Pittsburgh, PA 15264-3678. Write the title (Regional liaison for Ireland and the UK) and the ECO number (E052803) on the subject line of the check and put it on your cover letter, too.

Another ECO account, E442202, Peacemaking in Europe, allows us to use funds to provide further training and support for partners in the Irish churches engaging in peacemaking activities or some of the local projects where our Young Adult Volunteers serve. From time to time it also allows us to buy teaching materials and resources to use in special educational projects or training.

Churches or individuals wishing to specifically support the Young Adult Volunteer program in Northern Ireland can send contributions to account E047997. Write Northern Ireland YAV on the subject line of your check.

To give online, click one of the buttons below:

Regional Liaison to Ireland and the U.K.

Peacemaking in Northern Ireland.

Young Adult Volunteers in Northern Ireland.