by Jennifer Davis
Washington Office on Africa

News from Sudan has not improved since our May report, despite the spotlight of international attention. Darfur even made it into the first U.S. presidential debate in September, though neither candidate displayed real concern about long-term U.S.–Africa policy and its impact on continuing conflict and poverty on the continent.

There is growing acknowledgement that the Government of Sudan is waging a deliberate campaign of death, dispossession and destruction against the people of Darfur, mostly against the non-Arab Fur, Zaghawa and Masaalit groups. This is in retaliation for the armed "rebellion" launched in October 2003 by the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to demand an end to the exclusion from all economic and political power of the large African (mainly Muslim) farming population of Darfur. These people had historically lived in the region in relative peace along with nomadic, pastoral "Arabized" cattle herders, although there have long been tensions over access to land and water, which increasing desertification has worsened. 

The current crisis in Darfur, analysts say, is a continuation of a 15-year effort by Khartoum to put down potential political challenges and get rid of rebels demanding greater regional autonomy and power sharing. The political and economic agenda of the SLA and JEM includes an increased share in Sudan government spending for schools, hospitals and regional development, along with expanded self-government and a possible federal system of governance. 

The government response to the latest threat to its exclusive control was swift and brutal, invoking scorched earth attacks on villages and populations by a combination of official government forces and armed militia, known as the Janjawiid. In December 2003 U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland told the world that Darfur "has quickly become one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world." At least 1.7 million people, out of around 6.5 million in the Darfur region, are now internally displaced, and more than 230,000 have fled across the border into Chad.1 In September the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that as many as 10,000 Darfuris are dying each month in the ill-equipped camps into which they fled from the Janjawiid and Sudan government military attacks.2

The government denies responsibility for militia actions, but on-the-ground evidence provides a very different reality. Humanitarian workers and reporters able to reach the displaced and the refugees continue to hear descriptions of events which reveal close links between the various forces involved in the onslaught. "First the airplanes came to bomb the village and then the Janjawiid followed, on horse and foot, burning, looting and raping" is a widely heard description of events  witnessed by the refugees.

In July 2004, Human Rights Watch released four documents which exposed official support of militia activities as a matter of Khartoum policy. After a visit to Darfur this September, Sen. Jon Corzine and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke concluded:

"The goal of the central government in supporting and encouraging the Janjaweed seems clear; to "depopulate" — that is, destroy — the villages and create as many refugees as possible in order to eliminate the village structure of Darfur, which is a base for the activity of (the) two rebel movements."3

Tunnel Vision Impedes Peace

Effective international action to end the violence, now frequently described as genocide, has still not followed the growing awareness of the Darfur crisis. In addition, Sudan church leaders have expressed major concern  that the international community appears willing only to focus on the most publicised African case of the moment, so that the broader issues of war and peace for all Sudanese are being ignored.

An August meeting of the Sudan Council of Churches warned its international partners about recent delays in the Naivasha peace process, which has entailed more than two years of effort — with international participation — to negotiate a permanent and just end to  the 21-year north-south civil war between the Sudan People 's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Khartoum government, in which an estimated two million people have been killed.4

Talks on security issues established a model allowing two armies during an interim period, with some joint units, but did not resolve many issues, like power sharing, wealth sharing — especially oil revenues — and the status of marginal areas. Negotiations ground to a halt, probably because Sudan hoped that distracted international attention would allow it to derail the Navaisha process.

In August, the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference pointed out that the violent pattern of divide and rule in Darfur was not a new one for Sudan, and that "thousands in other parts of Sudan, such as the Malakal district, silently face equally devastating violence at the hands of militias actively supported by the Khartoum government." The peace talks were to begin again on October 7, and Yasir Arman, spokesman for the SPLA warned: "The alternative to a comprehensive peace settlement is comprehensive war. We prefer to finalise the peace agreement...We are hopeful that this time the government (Khartoum) will have the political will to finalise the deal." 

Such concerns underscore the importance of the international community maintaining pressure on the Khartoum government in an overall effort to achieve peace, participation and justice for all the people of Sudan. A permanent peace will need to invoke national reconciliation, ending the marginalization of huge sectors of the country and population and the narrow domination of power by Khartoum. 

Saying "Genocide" Is  Not Enough

In April 2004 worldwide  ceremonies marked the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide — in which at least 800,000 people were murdered. World leaders and statesmen made speeches pledging "never again," but that month U.N. Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Egeland briefed the U.N. Security Council on the coordinated "scorched-earth" campaign of ethnic cleansing by Janjawiid militia — and the Security Council took no action.

In the U.S., a growing grassroots movement began mobilizing to make "never again" a reality. Many diverse voices urged the U.S. government to call the Darfur crisis genocide. The demand was made at Washington demonstrations organized by a broad spectrum of U.S. faith-based, humanitarian, civic and human rights organizations. It was central to an Africa Action petition with 28,800 signatures delivered to Secretary of State Powell, and it was highlighted across the country in local activities organized by a growing network which included students, many Africa activists and scholars.

As a last act before the 2004 summer recess, both the Senate and the House unanimously passed  a resolution naming the situation genocide, and called for a U.S.-led multilateral, or unilateral, intervention to stop the genocide, should the U.N. Security Council fail to act.5

But the international attention did not bring consensus on how to provide security. Continuing atrocities were widely described, but the political will to halt them seemed entangled in complex debate about whether the Sudanese military and the state-sponsored Janjawiid were responsible for crimes against humanity, or war crimes, "ethnic cleansing," or genocide. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Colin Powell took a message of concern to Khartoum in June, holding discussions with the government, visiting Darfur camps for displaced people and refugee camps in Chad. Both leaders avoided describing the situation as genocide, though activists believed this designation would allow authorization of international action to prevent and punish the atrocities under the 1948 "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" to which 130 countries are signatories, including the United States.

It took the U.S. government another two months to make the declaration of genocide, after U.S. investigators had recorded testimonies from 1,136 refugees and displaced people who had fled Darfur. On September 9th Secretary of State Powell testified to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that: "We concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility and genocide may still be occurring."

Powell made it disturbingly clear that the genocide finding would bring no swift U.S. action, while acknowledging that "some seem to have been waiting for this determination of genocide to take action. In fact, how- ever, no new action is dictated by this determination. We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese Government to act responsibly."

African Union Action

A notable exception to international foot-dragging on action against the violence has come from the newly established 53-nation African Union (AU). It helped broker a ceasefire agreement early in 2004 involving all parties, signed in N'Djamena April 8. This laid the basis for the deployment of international monitors and a protection force under the AU, to which Sudan agreed.

Within six weeks the AU had deployed the first observers, who urgently reported on Khartoum-sponsored violations. By September 13th Sam Ibok (director of the AU 's Peace and Security Council) reported 185 observers operating, with  a 310-strong force of Rwandan and Nigerian soldiers assigned to provide protection for the monitors. Logistical problems delayed full deployment, and the force was too small to provide security to millions of civilians at risk, but Rwandan President Kagame declared that his troops would not repeat the U.N. experience in Rwanda — standing by and watching violence perpetrated against civilians because of a limited "mandate." The vast and difficult terrain involved in the conflict (the size of France or Texas) soon led the AU to see the need to mount a much larger peacekeeping force (perhaps 2,000-5,000 soldiers) mandated to protect civilian lives, but Khartoum continued to reject this force and the AU would not act in defiance of the Sudan government. 

The AU also continued mediating talks between the SLA, the JEM and Khartoum, to prepare for a political settlement. AU chairman, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, convened talks in Abuja, Nigeria, but observers believe progress will be slow without international pressure on Khartoum to compromise.  

Tardy United Nations Security Council Intervention

On July 30th the U.N. Security Council finally passed its first resolution in response to the Darfur atrocities (Res. 1556). The resolution was notable for what it failed to do.

• It placed no arms embargo on the Sudan government.
• It called on Khartoum to disarm the militia, apprehend and bring to justice the Janjawiid leaders who carried out the violence, stop attacks on civilians and remove restrictions on humanitarian relief. 
• It imposed a 30-day deadline for implementation, but provided for no penalties, such as sanctions, in the absence of progress. Even the 30-day deadline proved sadly flexible.

On September 18th, U.S. efforts led to the passage of a second Security Council resolution, which did not penalize Sudan for failure to carry through on disarming the Janjawiid, or bringing perpetrators of violence to justice. The resolution did not name the Sudan government as responsible for the atrocities in Darfur, and again failed to impose any immediate oil, arms or other effective sanctions on Khartoum. China, which has significant oil interests in Sudan, threatened a veto and abstained after achieving removal of sanctions language.

Some small forward steps were registered in the provision for the rapid establishment of an international commission of enquiry to establish accountability for human rights violations that have taken place, and "to determine also whether acts of genocide have occurred." Potentially even more significant, the resolution approved the deployment of an expanded African Union monitoring force, and "encourages the undertaking of proactive monitoring." 

Without strong international logistical and financial support this force cannot provide an adequate presence for the protection of civilians. The lack of sanctions means that the income from oil production will help finance Sudan government violence. It can easily buy arms.

Urgent Tasks

Challenge starvation, thirst, and disease.

The crisis has forced the U.N. to keep revising upwards the funds needed to establish and maintain survival camps able to provide adequate food, clean water, sanitation and health facilities for the flood of people driven off their land. In mid-September U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan told member states that the U.N. was still short by $250 million of the $722 million it needed for immediate relief.  

The United Nations has not mustered the political will to stop the killing, but its many humanitarian agencies are playing an important role in delivering survival food, water, shelter, basic health and maternal care to people in need. William Garvelink, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator USAID, told a press conference on October 4 that the U.S. had pledged $299 million for Darfur assistance in 2004 and 2005, and $257 million had already gone, $187 million to U.N. agencies. (Click for more information.) It remains for concerned activists in the U.S. to ensure that the U.S. expands its contribution, also using its leverage to encourage support from other members of the international community. Leaders in Congress need to hear this message early and often. End impunity and impose sanctions.

Until the Sudan government reaps pain, rather than profit, from its policies of violence and dispossession, it will have no incentive to end the killing, begin serious negotiations and lay the groundwork for peace. Calls on Khartoum to diminish insecurity and the threat to civilians and demands that the militia be disarmed must carry with them a real price for failure to comply. Targeted sanctions can play an important role in pressuring Khartoum to abandon its gallop through the killing fields. In September Rep. Thomas Tancredo introduced the "Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act" (HR 5061). It mandated U.S. sanctions, including a prohibition on any entity which does business in Sudan being able to raise capital or sell its securities in the U.S. and imposes bans on the issuing of visas to senior Khartoum government and military until Sudan takes a comprehensive set of actions to end the violence and build peace. It also mandated the provision of significant aid to Sudan, provided the regime complies with the conditions for peace set out.

Sadly, strong economic sanctions did not survive passage of HR 5061 by the House of Representatives on October 7, and the unanimous September Senate action (S 2781) was marred by similar weakness. 

There is work to be done: the drive to impose effective sanctions can provide focus in the months ahead, enabling activists to exert pressure on the administration, the international community and Khartoum. 

Support the African Union peacekeeping force.

Following the September  U.N. Security Council Resolution that approved the deployment of an expanded African Union monitoring force, and encouraged the undertaking of proactive monitoring,  the AU Chairman, Nigerian President Obasanjo, told the Security Council that the African Union was gearing up to provide a 3,000-5,000 strong force from five African nations This force would operate under an expanded mandate, so that it would be able to provide urgently needed protection for civilians by patrolling, entering IDP camps and effectively serving as a peacekeeping force. Obasanjo asked that international donors make this immediately possible by providing $200 million or making available transport and other logistical assistance.  

So far the U.S. has provided some $20 million for previous African Union-Sudan operations. The support will have to be multiplied significantly to provide the AU with the capability to help end the killing and create a climate of peace.

General Assembly

The 206th General Assembly urged its members, congregations, leaders, and governing bodies to be strong advocates for peace with justice in Sudan, pressing U.S. elected officials to give focused attention to the crisis in Sudan and to exert U.S. government influence within the international community of nations including the United Nations, the Organization of Africa Unity, the Arab League, and any multilateral initiatives that offer hope for progress. (Minutes, 1994, p. 570)