The recent outbreak of ethnic violence on the island of Borneo once again brought Indonesia to the headlines of the world media. The attacks by indigenous Dayaks against Madurese migrants were shocking not only for the graphic nature of the killings but also due to their unexpected location. Over the past several years, large areas of Indonesia have been wracked by conflicts: Aceh, West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya), Maluku (Ambon), and East and West Timor being the most prominent. The province of Central Kalimantan, where the February attacks occurred, had not experienced such violence. But conflict in Indonesia is spreading across this archipelago of over 200 million people-the world's fourth largest nation.

The conflict on Borneo, like those in other regions, has many complex causes and can not be reduced to ethnic hatred or religious disagreements alone, although these factors may play a role. Less obvious, but equally important contributors include former president Suharto's policies of transmigration, the Javanese-centered structure of the Indonesian state, and the continuing complicity of the armed forces in provoking violence and human rights abuses.

Once a Cold War client of the U.S., Indonesia now has a democratically elected government and is making efforts to implement rule of law and human rights guarantees. U.S. policy toward Indonesia has recognized these developments, providing large amounts of aid following the Asian economic crisis, but also joining international interventions to protect the newly independent country of East Timor. One key issue for the new Bush administration will be the possible resumption of ties with Indonesia's military, which were suspended following the army's rampage in East Timor. As the ongoing violence in Aceh, West Papua, Maluku and now Borneo show, however, the Indonesian army has not demonstrated a commitment to reform or to respect for basic human rights.

Transmigration and Javanese Chauvinism

Indonesia is a sprawling multi-ethnic state stretching over 2,200 miles from Aceh in the west to Papua in the east. When the newly-formed Republic of Indonesia won its independence from the Dutch in 1949, little common national identity existed. The central island of Java was volatile and overcrowded, while many peripheral regions suffered from underdevelopment. To promote a vision of national development and to relieve overcrowding, but also to undermine political dissent, the military regime of President Suharto began in the 1960's to move large populations from Java and other inner islands to the outer reaches of the country. Some, like the Madurese recently driven from Borneo, left their homes more or less voluntarily in search of economic opportunity.

This transmigration policy, as it was called, did not serve to promote common interests or understanding between indigenous communities and the transmigrants. Instead, the benefits of development-schools, markets, infrastructure-and land itself, went largely to the newcomers, leading to increasing alienation among the original inhabitants. When conflict arose, Suharto used the army to respond quickly and brutally. The government's legal and economic policies also benefited the central regions (i.e. Java) over the periphery.

Initial demands by indigenous leaders did not call for independence, only (as one eastern Indonesian puts it) "to get the Javanese and the migrants off our backs." When these calls for equity were ignored, differences between groups began to escalate. In some cases, people rediscovered or strengthened their original ethnic identities. In other areas, conflict took on a religious dimension, as largely Christian residents in Ambon and Papua, for instance, were confronted with a growing migrant Muslim community. It is not enough, however, to blame current violence on longstanding ethnic and religious hatreds that had been suppressed under Suharto. In some cases, supporters of the former Suharto regime have deliberately fanned the flames of civil unrest for their own political gain.

Both the post-Suharto leadership of B.J. Habibie and the current government of Abdurrahman Wahid have taken partial steps towards recognizing the problem of regional inequalities by passing decentralization policies and promising more autonomy to the regions. The transmigration program has been abandoned. Yet thousands of refugees are trapped in conflict situations, including 100,000 in West Timor alone. Without resolving the root causes of the conflicts, the refugees will not be able to return home and could even become the source of new conflicts.

The Complicity of the Military and Police

The Indonesian military remains far more powerful relative to the organs of civil government, yet the central command structure has broken down to a degree where there is little connection between orders given in Jakarta and what actually happens in the outer islands. In Aceh and Papua, troops supposedly sent to restore order have instead committed large-scale human rights abuses, making an already tense situation far worse. In Ambon and now Borneo, troops and police have not only failed to restore order after ethnic rioting but have themselves taken sides in the conflicts.

The reasons for the military and police behavior remain unclear in many cases. Are those with similar ethnic backgrounds to parties in a conflict siding with their group rather than national interests? Or are the military and police's actions part of a deeper plot to destabilize the civilian government of Wahid and return Indonesia to military rule? No military officials have been held accountable for their actions and the abuses are continuing. Unless official impunity is ended, the behavior of the security forces is unlikely to improve.

Opposition to Wahid is widespread and growing. Despite his commitment to democracy and respect for human rights, his erratic style of governing and allegations of corruption have seriously weakened his power. The party of Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri commands the most popular support, but also has closer ties to the military. If the central government changes, any new administration will likely be less sympathetic to regional concerns. Under these conditions, calls for regional independence will become justifiably louder, placing the survival of a unified Indonesia in question.

Unlike the days of the Cold War, the U.S. can now exert only limited influence over events in Indonesia. But it can, through well-chosen aid and diplomatic initiatives, encourage a wider role for Indonesia's civil society and justice system, which are the only institutions capable of reducing the role of the security forces. Resuming ties with the military would send exactly the opposite message and encourage human rights abuses to spread.

Concerned Americans, therefore, should write and call members of Congress in support of greater economic and humanitarian assistance to Indonesia, but no aid or training for security forces.

Copy of the March 2001 Sign On Letter to Secretary of State Powell:

The Honorable Colin Powell
Secretary of State
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Powell:

As a member of a non-governmental organization concerned with human rights, justice, peace, democracy in Indonesia and East Timor, we are writing to urge you to express strong opposition to any resumption of military ties between the United States and Indonesia. Rather, the U.S. government should condemn ongoing severe human rights violations against civilians by Indonesian security forces throughout the archipelago, especially in Aceh, West Papua/Irian Jaya, and Maluku. Strong U.S. support should be directed toward Indonesia's under-resourced civil society and troubled justice system.

While some progress in democratization efforts has been made by President Abdurrahman Wahid, Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, and others throughout the last year, the Indonesian military (TNI) has strongly reasserted its power. Brutal TNI terror campaigns escalated throughout the archipelago; military personnel expressing reform-minded agendas have been demoted or fired; 38 parliamentary seats have been reserved for security forces until at least 2009; and the military's corrupt business interests are as strong as ever. Before any re-engagement with the Indonesian military is undertaken, we believe that, at a minimum, the following benchmarks must be met.

• Dissolution of the military's territorial command structure.
• Elimination of the military's role in the economy.
• Reduction of extremely high troop numbers in Aceh, West Papua, and Maluku.
• Safe access for international humanitarian and human rights agencies and workers.
• An end to military "sweeps."
• Release of political prisoners.
• Disarming and disbanding of militias in West Timor and the arrest of militia leaders.
• Accountability for human rights violations committed in East Timor and throughout Indonesia by military and police personnel.

Recent developments in West Papua/Irian Jaya demonstrate the need for ongoing concern about the Indonesian military's role in human rights violations. In early December, Indonesia's security forces began a crackdown on supporters of independence for the province, resulting in at least 10 deaths and the arrests of dozens of political leaders. Local human rights organizations have documented brutalities and physical assaults on political prisoners, and the military and police have restricted public access to courtroom proceedings. More recently, the Indonesian government refused to allow international observers or the media to attend the trials of seven independence activists on the basis that the trials were being conducted in accordance with Indonesian law and were therefore "internal matters."

In Aceh, the recently renewed cease-fire was almost immediately greeted with the murder of civilians by Indonesian security forces. While students, human rights activists, and humanitarian workers are daily targeted for execution and torture by police and TNI officers, the Indonesian government is increasing the already extremely high troop numbers in the province. Because of serious safety concerns, a much-needed international presence is absent from Aceh and is therefore unable to monitor conditions and provide humanitarian assistance.

In Maluku, Jihad forces have recently been filmed with local police commands. These militia, imported from Java and other areas outside Maluku, are fueling a conflict which has claimed thousands of lives and displaced tens of thousands in the last three years. What is needed in Maluku is an international presence to provide transparency and encourage accountability, not more armed forces that thwart both.

Additionally, we urge you to express to Mr. Shihab clear and unreserved support for an international tribunal for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor. The demonstrated inability of Indonesia's judicial system to bring Indonesian military and police personnel and militia leaders to justice, as well as the defiant lack of cooperation of the TNI and Indonesian parliament with UN investigations of atrocities committed in East Timor, make this essential. An international tribunal is not only necessary for justice, reconciliation, and democracy in East Timor, it will hold the TNI officers involved, the vast majority of whom retain positions of power in Indonesia, accountable for past crimes against humanity and deter them from committing further human rights abuses.

We strongly recommend that you make clear to Mr. Shihab the pressing need to finally disarm and disband militias controlling some 100,000 East Timorese refugees still trapped in West Timor. According to credible sources, over the last year militias continued to receive support and arms from the military, commit numerous extra-judicial killings, and conduct border incursions into East Timor. The threat posed to East Timor's security, peace, and integrity, as well as to the stability of West Timor, by long-term militia control of refugee camps backed by TNI elements should not be underestimated.

While we acknowledge that the Government of Indonesia has formally separated the police from the military under law, we must emphasize that no practical evidence of this split has yet been reported. In fact, in many areas the two remain indistinguishable, operating together in joint operations, often in plain clothes. In Aceh, it is the police who have territorial command responsibility for continuing beatings, arrests, disappearances and brutal extra-judicial executions, despite a negotiated cease-fire.

While emphatically opposing any re-engagement with Indonesian security forces, we urge you to convey to Mr. Shihab strong support for democratization in Indonesia and civilian governmental institutions. This should include support for civil society through direct aid to human rights and humanitarian organizations, technical assistance and funding for Indonesia's judicial system, and funding and effective distribution of aid to Indonesia's hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people and refugees.

We appreciate your consideration of these serious matters and look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

General Assembly Guidelines

With the situation in Indonesia increasingly unstable, the 2000 Assembly lifted up the escalating religious violence in Maluku as being of particular concern. It was reported that well armed and well-trained Muslim jihad fighters from different islands were attacking Christians and burning their homes. Some elements of the Indonesian military joined in the killing.

The Assembly noted that they did not believe Christians were the only innocent victims, but that there was a threat to their continued existence in North and Central Maluku. It stated that the scale of the tragedy unfolding dwarfed that of East Timor and was threatening to turn into a massacre.

Accordingly, it urged the President of the United States and the Secretary of State to use all diplomatic means, including the immediate suspension of military assistance, to urge the government of Indonesia to end any military support for attacks on Christians and to guarantee the safety and human rights of all minority populations. It called for an immediate investigation into human rights abuses and for UN observers and a peacekeeping force for Ambon and the North Halmhera Islands.

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This article was written by Andrew Wells-Dang of the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace. Series editor: Rich Houston. Issue date: April 2001. For information about regular or email subscriptions or reprint permission, please contact Rich Houston.