Conflict Ahead: The Chinese and National Missile Defense

On Secretary Colin Powell's recent trip to Beijing, he tried to reassure Chinese leaders who fear that the national missile defense being developed by the United States is intended to neutralize China's small nuclear deterrent rather than defend the US against "rogue" nations such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. Powell stated that the Bush administration wants a "limited" capability to shoot down long range missiles. While Powell may prefer that any future missile defense be limited, evidence suggests that he is losing the policy debate within the administration.

The 2002 Defense authorization bill proposes a $3 billion dollar increase in missile defense efforts next year most of which is for systems that could provide longer-range capabilities not simply the shorter range systems. The bill is likely to include provisions authorizing activities which will violate the Anti-Ballistic missile treaty and accelerate research, development, and deployment of a missile defense system. The specifics on the Pentagon plan are not clear at this point but it is estimated that the United States will deploy at least 1,000 defensive interceptors capable of shooting down long-range missile warheads. This system would make China's arsenal obsolete. It could theoretically intercept not just its current force of 20 strategic warheads but an even greater number of warheads it might deploy in the future.

China is currently working on long term modernization and expansion of its nuclear forces. While US analysts perceive this as a strategic threat, China's nuclear force will remain relatively small, and the US will still maintain its massive retaliation deterrent.

While the Bush administration maintains that the capabilities of the national missile defense will be enough to provide protection from "rogue" states while not threatening the Russian and Chinese, the Chinese see things differently. From the Chinese perspective the national missile defense represents a substantial threat to its national security. Chinese officials, suspicious that the missile defense's real objective is to neutralize China's nuclear deterrence capability, argue that Washington has greatly exaggerated the threat of the "rogue" state.

Another concern for China is the impact of the missile defense system in East Asia. The US and Japan are working together to develop a missile defense to protect Japanese targets against regional missile attacks, most specifically North Korea. The Chinese do not perceive the threat from North Korea as so grave that it necessitates these measures. Thus, the collaboration intensifies fears that both the US and Japan are seeking less constraint to act against China.

Chinese officials perceive the deployment of missile defense in East Asia as a direct challenge to China's legitimate interests in the region. China sees this development as a signal that US and Japanese long-term intentions are confrontational rather than collaborative and as a sign of a US policy aimed at containing China.

The United States has not taken Chinese reactions sufficiently into account in it's policymaking, mainly because of reluctance in some quarters to treat China as a global strategic actor. However, China's strategic global role is growing in the post-cold war world and China's reactions can affect the success of long term US strategic policy in the region.

The fate of the ABM treaty is a major factor in US-China relations. Recently, a special pentagon panel concluded that US missile defense plans may violate the ABM treaty as early as 2000. Among the actions considered a potential violation of the treaty are the next national missile defense test planned for February 2002 and the construction of a new missile defense facility in Ft. Greely, Alaska. And, the Bush administration has announced its intention to either teminate the ABM treaty with Russia's consent or, barring this, unilaterally withdraw from the treaty sometime over the next several months. If the US proceeds with this policy it will be an incentive for Russia and China to cooperate on a great number of strategic issues. This would help China develop countermeasures to missile defense. On the other hand, if the ABM treaty is renegotiated between Russia and the US in order to allow the deployment of a missile defense system, it would likely isolate China who would then look for allies wherever it could. A US-Russia agreement would likely preserve Russia's nuclear deterrent while undermining the deterrent capability of China's much smaller forces. It would then be very difficult to achieve cooperation on non-proliferation of missile technology to the very states the national missile defense is being developed to defend against, North Korea, Iran and others.

The Bush administration needs to be more aware of how its activities are perceived by the Chinese and must avoid treating China with disrespect. The US should avoid bullying tactics. These are counter productive and will encourage the Chinese government to increase military spending and develop military ties with other countries. This would hurt the long-term interests of the United States.

The Bush administration must also reconsider its policy on national missile defense. Pressuring the Chinese to accept national missile defense would be counterproductive and possibly push the Chinese into building more intercontinental ballistic missiles and selling sensitive technology to other countries.

Expensive, high tech weapons are no substitute for effective diplomacy, arms control, disarmament, and international cooperation. Cooperative international arms control and disarmament agreements will be far more effective in advancing peace and security in the years ahead and will cost far less than a missile shield.

Action

The Senate Armed Services committee will mark up the 2002 Defense Authorization bill immediately after Labor day. Please contact your legislators today, especially if they serve on the House or Senate Armed Services committee. Urge them to oppose any provisions in the Defense Authorization bill which would authorize missile defense program activities and violate the ABM treay. The US should not rush to deploy a missile defense system that would undermine international arms control and disarmament efforts. Please contact your senators and representatives or organize a delegation to meet with them to discuss these concerns over the August and Labor Day recess.

The following Senators are of special importance on this issue -

Senate Armed Service Committee

Liberman (D-CT), Warner (R-VA), McCain (R-AZ), Roberts (R-KS), and Collins (R-ME)

Senate Appropriations Committee

Byrd (D-WV), Specter (R-PA), Dominici (R-NM) and DeWine (OH)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Lugar (R-IN), Hagel (R-NE), Smith (R-OR), Frist (R-TN) and Chafee (R-RI)

General Assembly

"The General Assembly has advocated the development of a new meaning of security based on common interest, cooperation, and trust, understanding that if any country is to be secure, all must be secure, and understanding that military power can never be the ultimate basis for world security. It has argued that the quest for military security stimulates arms races, heightens tensions, and often leads to conflict, thereby threatening the very foundations of security sought."

"To achieve this understanding of common security, the 206th General Assembly (1994) calls for:

Denuclearization of the Asia-Pacific region by:

Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), renewing it in 1995, enhancing safeguard provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and encouraging all Asis-Pacific countries--specifically India, Pakistan, North and South Korea, and Japan--to forgo development of nuclear weapons, adhere to the NPT, and abide by IAEA standards;

Mutual agreement of the nuclear powers in the region--the United States, China, France, and Russia--to fulfill their obligations under the NPT to end nuclear weapons development, adhere to a moratorium on testing until testing can be terminated by a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and agree upon and carry out a systematic destruction of existing nuclear weapons in a program committed to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.