In 1986, during the national debate on President Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal, the Presbyterian General Assembly adopted a resolution that called upon the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union "to cease research, development and testing plans for space-based ballistic missile defense systems." The ambitious Reagan plan for a national nuclear defense umbrella was ultimately abandoned, not because of international policy considerations but because of the cost and the inability to develop a viable and dependable technology. Since then, more than $50 billion has been invested in research and development and no reliable system for hitting incoming intercontinental ballistics missiles has been demonstrated.

Nevertheless, Congress and the President are again on the verge of a decision about whether to commit to deployment of a miniaturized version of a national missile defense (NMD) system.

Why Now?

With the end of the Cold War, interest in the project waned since it was conceived as defense against the thousands of missiles aimed by the Soviet Union at U.S. targets. In the absence of any viable system of missile defense, the U.S. and the Soviet Union for decades had avoided all-out nuclear war by holding one another hostage with the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Under the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, it was agreed that neither would develop a missile defense that the other could not overwhelm with its thousands of nuclear warheads.

This time around, proponents, including the Clinton Administration, seek only a small system that they maintain is necessary to make the U.S. secure from a single or small number of nuclear missiles launched by "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. Concern grew in 1998 when North Korea test-fired a long-range missile that passed over Japan and splashed down not too far from Hawaii. In the same year, both India and Pakistan carried out underground nuclear tests, increasing anxiety that they might soon possess deliverable weapons. And continuing economic crisis in both Russia and North Korea made it more likely that they would sell both nuclear technology and weapons to other countries with more cash than scientific and engineering competence.

Suddenly, to some in government and out, the world seemed less safe for the United States.

Why Not Deploy a Mini-NMD?

Critics point to several reasons why the U.S. should not deploy a mini-star wars system. First, the technology is complex and still far from reliable. Effectively, it involves hitting a bullet in flight with a bullet fired later. The proposed system requires: detecting immediately the launch of a hostile intercontinental missile; using satellites and ground stations to determine its path and target; distinguishing between the nuclear warhead and decoys or rocket debris; maintaining a firing system always at the ready with only moments to respond; colliding with the incoming missile while in flight; destructing at an altitude that will not create nuclear danger to those on earth, especially in the country being defended.

Last year there was a successful interception in a test firing over the Pacific Ocean, but another test in January failed. Critics point out that a proposed system that works in the controlled environment of a test might still fail under conditions of surprise and deception.

Second, deployment of even a small system against "rogue state" launches would violate the ABM Treaty with Russia. The Treaty allows each country to establish a single anti-missile site to protect either its capital or part of its missile force. Russia maintains such a site outside Moscow, probably for reasons more political than military. Years ago, the United States abandoned the option, fearing that the nuclear interceptors might explode over a populated area. Even a mini-NMD system would require several radar sites and anti-missile batteries. Such a violation would necessitate renegotiating the ABM Treaty.

The Clinton Administration wants to renegotiate the ABM Treaty in order to assure Russia that the proposed small system is not aimed at them. The small number of NMD sites, however, would be easily overwhelmed by Russian missiles still in place. But with few resources to commit to a similar system, Russian fears of nuclear inferiority may cause them to renege on commitments made under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) to dismantle many existing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and to refuse to ratify START II, which has already been ratified by the U.S. That would leave in place thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert as the price of defending against the possible development of a few weapons by other states. It seems like a very bad bargain.

A third problem is that if basic agreements seem to be coming apart, it may encourage countries that presently have no nuclear weapons to embark upon a program to develop or purchase them. Thus, even a small U.S. NMD system may give greater impetus to the very nuclear proliferation that is driving the renewed interest in such a program. Among countries waiting in the thermonuclear wings would certainly be some that policy makers regard as "rogue states" -- or at least countries that, facing a less cohesive world, would opt for nuclear muscle to ward off regional threats or hegemonic domination.

A fourth issue is the concern expressed by U.S. allies about a proposed U.S. NMD program. Many fear that a small NMD system aimed at "rogue states" is really the camel's nose under the tent that will, step by step, lead to a full-blown U.S. anti-nuclear umbrella as soon as the technology is available. It is not that our international friends begrudge Americans a sense of security. But they do worry that the quest for a technology-based security may magnify the U.S. unilateralism characteristic of the post-Cold War period. Even our allies fear a world in which the U.S. is so dominant economically and militarily that it simply dictates international realities rather than negotiating them.

Another concern is that a NMD system focuses energy and resources on the wrong problem. Critics point out that far more Americans are at risk from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction delivered by suitcase, or cargo containers or short-range missiles fired from ships just off shore than by intercontinental missiles launched from small, unfriendly countries. Deployment of an NMD system might well lead to complacency about the need to address these more real threats.

Finally, there is the cost. The U.S. has spent about $3.5 billion per year on missile defense programs since President Reagan first introduced the Star Wars idea. Current plans call for that to rise to $4 billion over the next five years and include about $10.5 billion for deployment of the Clinton mini-NMD program. Of course, given the history of inflation in military contracts, the true cost might well be two or three times that amount. Proponents point out, however, that is dwarfed by projected spending increases on new weapons for the U.S. Air Force and Navy and represents a bargain in seeking security for the American people. With a projected $2 trillion budget surplus over the next decade, Congress will not likely worry much about the cost.

The Politics of Deciding

A limited NMD system is another of the Republican ideas co-opted by President Clinton. Following the introduction of their "Contract with America" of 1994, the new Republican-controlled Congress passed legislation mandating a NMD system by 2003; never mind that the technology did not even exist. President Clinton vetoed the bill but embraced the logic by committing to a three-year development program and postponing to the year 2000 the decision whether to deploy the system over three years. The President is expected to make that determination by July.

Last year, Defense Secretary William Cohen said that the threat of a small-scale nuclear attack merits deployment of a limited NMD system. He and other Administration figures, however, held that any such decision should also depend on demonstrated technical success, the projected cost and the impact on arms reduction efforts. Debate in Congress resulted in a bill, supported by all but two House Republicans and more than a quarter of the Democrats, that rejected the Clinton position and gave an immediate and unconditional endorsement of an NMD deployment.

A key concern of many in Congress is how deployment of a mini-NMD system might affect our relations with Russia since it would violate the ABM Treaty. Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, holds that the treaty is not only outdated but invalid, since it was negotiated with the former Soviet Union. He insists that the ABM Treaty be scrapped. Others in the Congress oppose the treaty on grounds that it focuses on retaliation rather than on protection of the American people.

The Clinton Administration wants to renegotiate the ABM Treaty with Russia so as to allow deployment of a limited NMD system. There are reasons Russia might comply. The U.S. can certainly bring economic pressure to bear if it does not. International purse strings might be loosened if the Kremlin cooperates.

Russia may also be concerned about nuclear weapons in the hands of unfriendly and unstable governments. Indeed, the "rogue states" most commonly mentioned by the U.S. are all closer to Moscow than to Washington, D.C. Some believe Russia might be interested in expanding its own antiquated Moscow defense system to increase the sense of national security.

But most of all, Russia might agree to a renegotiated ABM Treaty because it is better off with a mechanism for limiting U.S. missile defense than facing a future with no constraints.

The other foreign policy concern Congress will face in the mini-NMD system decision is how it will be received by China. The Chinese do not accept the U.S. explanation that the proposed system is aimed at "rogue states." They are convinced that U.S. deployment is really aimed at them, since it might provide enough interceptor missiles to negate the entire Chinese arsenal, leaving them at the mercy of a possible U.S. attack. Thus, any decisioni to deploy a U.S. mini-Star Wars system will be regarded as another way of limiting and threatening China. That sentiment will increase if the U.S. Senate fails to support China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) as negotiated with President Clinton last fall.

That the debate about deployment of a limited NMD system occurs in an election year will only complicate decision making. Neither congressional nor presidential candidates will want to risk looking "soft on defense' of American citizens. It will be harder in an election year to express concerns about the technology, the cost or the diplomatic risks involved in the establishment of a NMD system. Thus the danger is increased that we will embark upon the first step of a major reorientation, not only of our concept of national defense, but of how the U.S. relates to the rest of the world, without sufficient critical reflection on the consequences or the alternatives.

Suggested actions:

Last year, Congress appropriated funds for continued research and development of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system purportedly aimed at protecting the country against a small number of nuclear-armed, intercontinental missiles that might be launched by "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iraq, or Iran. The decision about whether to deploy such a system was postponed until this year. President Clinton has announced that he will make that determination by July.

While the issue will not be resolved before July, it is important to weigh in now about this matter before members of Congress or the President become absolutely and publicly committed.

1. Write to President Clinton. Acknowledge the appropriateness of the Administration's insistence last year that any decision regarding deployment of a NMD system should be dependent on an assessment of the viability of technology available, the cost and the potential impact on nuclear disarmament and U.S. foreign relations.

Urge him not to proceed with even a token deployment of a NMD system. Further, urge him to veto legislation that would require or fund deployment.

Address:

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

2. Write your members of Congress. Urge them to oppose legislation that would require deployment of even a token anti-missile defense system or provide further funding for its deployment.

Thank your representative if he/she opposed the Sen. Cochran substitute bill (HR 4 -- PL 106-38) last year declaring it national policy to deploy a national missile defense. (Call your representative's district office and ask how the member voted on the bill.)

In your letters to the President and Members of Congress, include reasons for opposing deployment of a missile defense system. Refer to one or more of the five points mentioned in the "Why Not Deploy a Mini-NMD" section of the background article.

Addresses:

The Honorable
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

General Assembly guidance:

Since the 1950s, General Assemblies of the Presbyterian Church have been consistent in urging a search for national security based on nuclear disarmament rather than on the development of technology-based defense systems. In a 1986 resolution, the Assembly called "upon the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to cease research, development and testing plans for space-based ballistic missile defense systems, and to enter into bilateral and multilateral negotiations in order to ban the testing and deployment of weapons in space, and to develop cooperatively peaceful uses of outer space."