Actions of the 106th Congress and the Clinton Administration may have set in place the framework for a renewed nuclear arms race and a very different U.S. security policy goal.

During most of the Cold War, the United States justified vast expenditures on nuclear weapons and inter-continental delivery systems as a necessary counter to a similar build-up by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the U.S. simultaneously espoused the vision of a world ultimately free of such weapons through negotiations and treaties.

This combination of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) with negotiations to control and reduce the number of nuclear weapons, however contradictory, had the virtue of placing U.S. policy-making firmly in an interactive international context.

That worldview may be passing. As expressed by a Washington Post news story, "The U.S. interest in a missile shield, combined with last fall's Senate rejection of a treaty that would ban all nuclear tests, has led friends and foes alike to believe that the United States is turning away from multilateral arms control solutions and is pursuing unilateral policies that emphasize the security of U.S. territory." (June 15, 2000, p. A24) Others go even further and suggest that the new policy goal of the U.S. is to establish a virtual monopoly of unassailable nuclear power.

Freezing Nuclear Numbers

When the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991, it was the long-sought beginning of a measured build-down from a policy of mutual nuclear terror. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev agreed to a mutual withdrawal of tens of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons and removed thousands more from hair-trigger alert. The result is that the total of nuclear weapons the two nations possess has fallen from 60,000 in 1991 to today's 35,000. Even so, START I was only a modest step that still allowed each adversary to maintain 6,000 to 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons, more than enough to destroy one another many times over.

Equally important was that negotiations for deeper cuts began almost immediately in START II talks that were initiated even before the first agreement was ratified or entered into force in 1994. Those negotiations were completed under Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993 and committed to cutting U.S. and Russian Strategic nuclear weapons to no more than half the START I levels.

At the point progress toward arms reduction stalled. Several factors contributed to the loss of momentum. While the U.S. Senate ratified START II, the Russian Duma (parliament) did not immediately follow suit. The economic collapse in Russia made support of past levels of military expenditures impossible. Loss of conventional forces that resulted caused Russian military strategists to be more and more wary about disassembling their nuclear deterrent. Russian politicians in the Duma opposed to Mr. Yeltsin held the proposed START II treaty hostage in attempts to force concessions on other issues. The result was that the treaty was not ratified by the Duma until this year when Vladimir Putin came to power.

Unfortunately, the Duma's delay gave time for second thoughts in the United States. Following the U.S. Senate's 1996 action, protocols were added to the START II treaty that must also be ratified before it can go into force. While these additions are not controversial, they have become entangled in the debate over establishment of a U.S. national missile defense. President Clinton caved in to calls for the first stages of such a system to defend against the possible launch of a few missiles by some "rogue state" such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. The problem is that such a system would be a direct violation of the existing Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Mr. Clinton has sought to renegotiate that treaty, but Russia has been adamant in refusing, saying that if the U.S. proceeds, it will regard all nuclear treaties as being nullified.

In the attempt to pressure the Russian Duma to act on START II, the U.S. Senate has refused to allow this country's strategic nuclear weapons to fall below the 6,000 allowed by START I. Given the added protocols and the debate over the proposed national anti-missile defense system, it is not clear when or whether the Senate will take up these questions before Congress adjourns. Meanwhile, the U.S. is trapped by law into maintaining a strategic arsenal of 6,000 nuclear weapons, even when almost no one, including the Pentagon, tries to justify such a number in today's world.

How Many Nukes are Enough?

The Pentagon bases its calculation on a strategic war plan that calls for enough deliverable warheads to destroy a list of recognized vital targets in Russia and China. While the Cold War has been winding down, the number of targets has actually increased from 2,500 in 1995 to 3,000 today.

The Center for Defense Information, a Washington-based organization headed by retired U.S. military personnel, notes that the "vital Russian targets" are divided into four categories-nuclear, conventional, leadership, and war-supporting industry. The report then adds, "Believe it or not, there are 500 conventional key targets in a Russian army on the verge of nervous breakdown; 160 leadership targets in a country that is practically devoid of leadership; and 500 factories in a manufacturing complex that produced practically zero armaments last year." (A CDI website paper, "START III, the SIOP, and the Cold War Mindset," May 18, 2000) The remaining several hundred targets of the U.S. strategic war plan are in China.

The CDI background paper declares, "No sober U.S. general, much less a political leader, really believes that deterrence depends on the present scale of massive nuclear operations…

"There is no doubt whatsoever that deterrence would remain robust with far smaller arsenals on far lower levels of daily alert. The U.S. could easily drop to 1,500 warheads-the ceiling proposed by the Russians in START negotiations during the past several years…"

The Pentagon currently opposes cutting inter-continental nuclear weapons below the 2,000 to 2,500 level until a top-level strategic review is completed late next year. Nothing except U.S. politics, however, justifies keeping the present 6,000 nuclear weapons at the ready.

The Politics of a New START

Despite the Russian Duma's failure to ratify START II, things seemed hopeful for reducing the nuclear threat. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed upon an outline of START III at the 1997 Helsinki summit that should move toward the goal of cutting strategic nuclear warheads for each country to the 2,000 to 2,500 range.

Russia clearly favors smaller numbers because of the high cost of maintaining their nuclear arsenal. Thus far, no progress has been made despite the framework agreement. President Clinton has insisted that any further reduction must be tied to Russian acceptance of a renegotiation of the ABM treaty to allow for a limited system to protect against "rogue state" missile launches.

Perhaps even more important is the deep antipathy many Senate Republicans have for Mr. Clinton. For some, it is mere personal dislike. Others are loath to give him any type of political victory that might strengthen Democrats in the upcoming election. Many Republicans fear that Mr. Clinton will give away too much in the anxiety to build his own personal legacy. Still others are ready to abandon the joint nuclear reduction strategy entirely in favor of relying on vast U.S. nuclear superiority, coupled with development of an ABM defensive invulnerability.

These attitude have been the backdrop of the recent congressional debate on the FY 2001 defense appropriation bill (S.2549 and H.R. 4205) which will likely produce approval for $310 billion in military spending next year. Sen. Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.) put forward an amendment that would have eliminated the existing congressional ban on cuts in nuclear warheads below the START I level of 6,000. It was defeated.

On June 7, the Senate adopted an amendment fostered by Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that allows the president to make unilateral reductions in the U.S. strategic arsenal, but only after a Pentagon review scheduled to report in the fall of 2001.

Sen. Kerrey noted that such legislation is not only a slap at President Clinton but would also tie the hands of the new president, including George W. Bush, should he be elected. In a May 23 speech that outlined his foreign policy perspectives, candidate Bush endorsed the concept of deeper cuts in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal and removal of some strategic nuclear arsenal and removal of some strategic weapons from "hair-trigger" alert status, saying in part:

America should rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence in a new security environment. The premises of Cold War nuclear targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal…It should be possible to reduce the number of American significantly further that what has already been agreed to under START II, without compromising our security in any way. We should not keep weapons that our military planners do not need. These unneeded weapons are the expensive relics of dead conflicts. And they do nothing to make us more secure.

In addition, the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status-another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontations. Preparation for quick launch-within minutes after warning of an attack-was the rule during the era of superpower rivalry…(K)eeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. (Washington Post, June 4, 2000)

The Clinton-Gore administration, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee and the Pentagon consensus agree that the U.S. can safely make deep and immediate cuts in its present nuclear arsenal as part of negotiations with Russia that would move the world further back from the nuclear precipice. Members of Congress who have made this impossible need to explain why-if they can.

The 106th Congress has a dismal record in dealing with nuclear security issues. Last October the Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That potentially opens the door to all countries to join the nuclear club. Beyond that, Congress seems set on continuing to provide funds for a partial national missile defense system even before President Clinton recommends making it operational or adequate tests demonstrate its feasibility. It is time to begin building the momentum to change the nuclear equation next.

Written by Walter Owensby of the Washington Office, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).

Suggested Actions

Two-thirds of senators will not stand for election this year, and if history is any guide, most of those who do will be returned to office.

Note on which of the lists below your senators appear. Those on list A voted against the Warner amendment, which prohibits any consideration of reducing the nation's missile arsenal for at least 18 months. Write your senator(s) on this list and thank them for their vote to encourage the responsible reduction of nuclear weapons. Those on List B voted to support the Warner amendment. If your senator(s) is on this list, write saying something like this:

I am puzzled by your support for excessively high levels of U.S. long-range missiles, which the nation's security does not require and for which taxpayers should not have to pay. Please explain to me your reason for supporting the Warner amendment and how you propose to move the world back from the nuclear precipice. I urge you to begin working now to build a congressional majority that will support either Mr. Bush or Mr. Gore in reducing sharply the nation's arsenal of inter-continental missiles and nuclear warheads. Both have declared that this can be done without jeopardizing the nation's security.

Address
Senator______
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC 20510

General Assembly

In a resolution on "Disarmament Developments and Challenges" the 209th GA (1997) applauded those "giving their lives to the destruction of weapons," called for "the ratification and implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," and urged Presbyterians "to participate appropriately in the world campaign to abolish nuclear weapons…"