In January of 1995, a meteorological missile was fired from Norway to study the northern lights. At the same time, an unexplained blip suddenly appeared on the radar screens at a handful of radar stations in northern Russia. The radar operators, aware that a single nuclear missile from a U.S. submarine could scatter eight nuclear bombs over Moscow within fifteen minutes, notified their superiors of the unknown missile. The message passed quickly to President Boris Yeltsin. President Yeltsin spoke with his advisers and, for the first time in history, activated the "nuclear briefcase" that could order the firing of nuclear missiles in response.

Yeltsin and his generals watched as the separation of multiple rocket stages created the impression of a possible attack by several missiles. They debated and agonized for several minutes over whether the rocket was part of a surprise attack. After almost eight minutes, only a few minutes shy of the procedural deadline for responding to an impending nuclear attack, it was determined that the rocket was on a trajectory headed far out to sea. There was no threat to Russia.

The Norwegians had informed Russian officials well in advance of the launch of the missile for a high-altitude experiment. But, the message had never made its way to Russia's high command.

MAD Doctrine and Faulty Systems

This incident from 1995 and other similar ones demonstrate the dangers of maintaining nuclear arsenals in a state of hair-trigger alert and of maintaining the "launch-on-warning" strategy in general. Launch on warning means that if a country detects what it assesses to be a nuclear attack, it would launch its own missiles before enemy missiles could hit the ground. This mutually assured destruction is designed to hold each side in check by the threat of annihilation. With this strategy, the governments of both countries have only minutes to detect a possible nuclear attack and determine whether warnings are real. And, they have only minutes to confer with top advisers and decide whether to launch their nuclear missiles. Early warning systems are extremely faulty as demonstrated in the incident discussed above, and maintaining the "launch-on-warning" exacerbates the threat of war by miscalculation.

Despite the risks, the United States and Russia continue to keep "launch-on-warning" as the main option for their nuclear strategy. Both sides maintain their strategic missile forces on hair-trigger alert despite the fact that the policy poses a greater threat to their safety than the actual threat of their adversary.

Military planners in both Russia and the United States remain obsessed with the remote possibility of a deliberate nuclear attack by their previous enemy. It is assumed that the missiles in this "first strike" would be aimed against their own strategic nuclear missiles and their command centers. In order to prevent such an assault, each country tries to maintain the capacity to respond with a counterattack against the totality of military targets on its adversary's territory. In other words, the military planners must be able to ensure the rapid annihilation of thousands of targets thousands of miles away. In order to be able to achieve this result, both countries are ready to launch a massive retaliatory missile strike before the incoming warheads arrive. Both have their missiles on hair-trigger alert.

Accordingly, within just a few minutes of receiving instructions to fire, a large portion of the U.S. and Russian land-based rockets, armed with approximately 2,000 and 3,500 warheads respectively, could begin their 25-minute flights to their targets. U.S. Trident submarines at sea could launch about 1,000 warheads and Russian ballistic missile submarines could send 300 to 400 less than 15 minutes after being ordered to attack.

Increasing Danger

The threat of accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear missiles is more dangerous now than during the Cold War. The decline of Russia's economy has lead to deterioration of their early warning network and an increasing inability to distinguish a missile attack from natural phenomena or peaceful space ventures. Two-thirds of their ground based radar and satellites are inactive or failing. And, the significant gaps in the country's early-warning network make Russian military planners ever more nervous.

The ailing Russian economy has made it difficult for Russia to deploy most of its survivable forces (those nuclear forces capable of surviving a U.S. nuclear attack) - submarines at sea and mobile land based rockets. Because lack of qualified personnel and resources, the Russian navy has been forced to cut back a considerable portion of its operations. Currently, it is able to keep only two of its 26 ballistic missile submarines at sea on combat patrol at any one time. Russia has also been constrained to keeping most of its truck mounted mobile missiles parked in garages, leaving them vulnerable to attack. Only one or two regiments can be hidden by dispersing them in the field. This amplifies what Russia sees as its need for launch on warning as they fear they would have only a few nuclear weapons that would survive after absorbing a full nuclear attack from the United States.

Russia's deteriorating infrastructure increases the risk of a terrible mishap. There have been reports of utility companies' shutting off power to nuclear weapons facilities because the military has not paid the bills and of nuclear control equipment failing because thieves have stolen communications cables for their copper. In addition, the equipment that controls nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and crucial computers and other electronic equipment have moved into combat mode for no apparent reason.

Russia's nuclear establishment is facing a similar demise with a host of human and organizational problems. Because of increasing food and housing shortages, morale in the military has severely decreased. This disaffection affects all sectors from the elite Strategic Rocket forces to the custodians of Russia's stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This increases the danger that a desperate member of the armed forces might take unauthorized control of nuclear weapons. According to the CIA, some submarine crews may have the capability to fire their ballistic missiles with out having to obtain the special codes held by the General Staff. And, even at the top levels of government it is possible that the authority to launch a nuclear attack could be usurped by the military if there were an internal crisis. Some in Russia have argued that if the situation continues Russia will reach a point where it will no longer be in control of its missiles and nuclear systems.

Although the U.S. systems are more reliable, they have also experienced mishaps and false warnings. In 1979, all four U.S. nuclear command centers seemed to be picking up a full-scale nuclear missile attack by the Soviet Union. It was not detected that the signals were from a simulation tape until after Air Force planes had been launched.

The Solution: De-alerting

The rationalization that the danger of a possible enemy attack overrides the risks of an accidental or mistaken missile launch is outdated in the current political climate. When both countries are seeking normal economic and security relations, it is extremely dangerous behavior to continue the readiness to launch nuclear weapons on only a warning of an attack. However, this mentality is so engrained in the governments of the two countries that only unrelenting pressure from the public will bring about a change to a more realistic and safer strategy and a de-alerting of the nuclear missiles.

De-alerting of the nuclear missiles would greatly reduce the possibilities of an accidental nuclear war. It would give the U.S. and Russian leaders more time in order to make the most accurate and informed decision concerning a perceived threat. This increase in time furnishes a much-needed safeguard in case there has simply been a mistake made by the early warning systems or nuclear command and control. If the launch time of nuclear weapons were increased from minutes to days or even weeks, this extra time would function as a safety lock on the missiles preventing a cataclysmic mishap.

Even with the missiles de-alerted, the U.S. would still have the capability of a massive retaliation against a nuclear attack. De-alerting would not reduce the number of nuclear weapons. It would simply reduce the chances that errors of judgement or equipment would not cause a nuclear catastrophe. A mutual de-alerting would increase the security of both the U.S. and Russia by delaying both countries' ability to launch their nuclear weapons.

The nuclear missiles of both countries could be de-alerted by many different methods. Warheads and their missiles could be stored separately in areas where they are secure. The missiles' guidance systems could be removed. Large amounts of dirt could be poured on top of land-based missile silos, which would have to be removed before launch. And, the nuclear submarines can be moved out of range of their targets.

In addition, there is a precedent for de-alerting. President George Bush authorized the de-alerting of nuclear bombers in 1991 after the coup attempt in the Soviet Union left the control of nuclear weapons uncertain. Nuclear weapons were separated from their missiles and put in storage and thousands of tactical weapons were removed from the U.S. arsenal. Several days later President Gorbachev responded by removing tactical nuclear weapons from the Russian arsenal and de-alerting Soviet missiles.

If an agreement to de-alert is made, there are many ways to verify that both countries are complying with the agreement. Nuclear submarines can be monitored by satellites in order to certify that they remain out of firing range. Electronic seals can be placed on the missiles that have had their nuclear warheads removed. This would allow the tracking of the equipment to ensure that nothing is tampered with. And, other de-alerting strategies could be monitored by the inspection procedures currently agreed upon in previous nuclear weapons treaties.

The de-alerting of the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United states would not only increase their own security but would also increase the security of the global community. It would reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, pave the way for deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals, and provide an example that would help prevent other countries from maintaining their nuclear weapons on high alert. De-alerting is a crucial step toward building common security between nations.

Suggested actions:

Write the President-elect a letter expressing your support of the de-alerting of nuclear weapons. Tell him to end the threat of nuclear war by working with the Russians to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. Emphasize the following:

• Despite the fact the Cold War ended more than 10 years ago, Russia and the U.S. continue to keep five thousand nuclear weapons - the equivalent of 100,000 Hiroshima bombs - on hair-trigger alert. If a crisis occurred, the decision makers have only minutes to decide if a full out nuclear strike is necessary. One small mistake or miscalculation could pull both sides into a nuclear war.
• The decline of Russia's economy and infrastructure has increased the danger of accidental nuclear war. The poor conditions of Russian facilities and the low morale of the military personnel increase the risks of mistakes that could lead to a nuclear mishap.
  
• The U.S. and Russia must move to end the threat of accidental nuclear war by de-alerting their arsenals. This would give the U.S. and Russia more time to make a determination about a perceived threat. It would provide a margin of safety and function as a safeguard against accidental nuclear war.
  
• To protect the world from nuclear disaster, the U.S. can and should take the lead on de-alerting. There is a precedent. In 1991, President George Bush removed hundreds of U.S. warheads from high-alert status, which prompted President Gorbachev to do the same.
  
• Within our faith community, policies concerning nuclear weapons raise profound questions about our moral responsibilities, the integrity of God's creation, and human destiny.

Write to:
The Honorable__________
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

General Assembly Guidance

The 200th General Assembly (1988) of the Presbyterian Church (USA):

• Declared that since nuclear war cannot satisfy the criteria for just war, it cannot be understood to be in accordance with the provision of the Book of Confessions of the Presbyterian Church (USA).
  
• Stated that the policy of nuclear deterrence has been in danger of being regarded as an adequate, permanent means to national security rather than an interim measure of self-defense. Such a policy is not morally defensible. The work for peaceful alternatives needs to be vigorously pursued.
  
• Directed the Stated Clerk to notify the President and the Congress of the United States of the Assembly's conviction that neither the participation of the nation in nuclear war nor the policy of nuclear deterrence as an end in itself can be justified by the just war doctrine which is fundamental to the moral discourse about war and embedded in international law.
• Urged the energetic and unremitting pursuit of acceptable policy alternatives.