National Missile Defense: It Won't Work, but It Could Start a
New Arms Race
While the United States and Russia have made progress reducing
nuclear weapons in the past decade, the US could be setting
off a new arms race with plans to go forward with the 1980's
"Star Wars" ballistic missile defense program, known
as national missile defense (NMD). The NMD plan not only wastes
billions of dollars on an ineffective system, but could prompt
China and Russia to build or retain more nuclear weapons.
President Bush has stated that his most urgent military objective
is to build a national missile defense system that would shield
Americans from any ballistic missiles fired by "rogue"
nations - like North Korea and Iran. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and Secretary of State Powell have both suggested that the 1972
Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which governs defenses against
attacking missiles, might have to be scrapped. In his Senate
confirmation hearings Rumsfeld called the ABM treaty "ancient
history " and dismissed it as a "straight jacket."
The system that the Clinton administration was developing would
have been strictly land based, with interceptor missile from
Alaska. It was to include some satellites for tracking enemy
missiles, but no weapons in space. The Bush administrations,
however, is pushing for a more ambitious shield, possibly using
space based weaponry. These weapons do not exist yet but the
United States has been working for years on powerful lasers
that might someday be mounted on aircraft or satellites. This
would be in direct violation of the ABM treaty, which the Bush
administration wishes to discard, which bans space based lasers
to attack strategic intercontinental missiles. Other countries
- particularly Russia and China, but also many US allies - oppose
the US missile defense effort and warn that it could set off
an international arms race in space.
The Problem with NMB
Missile defense has two basic problems: It cannot do what it
is supposed to do, and it creates the very threats to American
national security it is supposed to resolve. For years, the
idea of being able to shoot down enemy missiles - hit a bullet
with a bullet - has remained a distant technological dream.
This has kept it far down the list of military and diplomatic
concerns, despite the billions of dollars spent to achieve it.
But the Bush administration has brought it to the forefront,
and in the process missile defense now stands as a major point
of argument in how the US relates to its allies in Europe and
Asia.
The Pentagon's current national missile defense plan uses ground-based
interceptors to launch "kill vehicles" that intercept
and destroy incoming ballistic missiles from states of concern"
such as North Korea and Iran. Despite years of research and
development, however, the system is not technologically ready.
The interceptors can easily be overwhelmed by countermeasures
such as decoys, and, the system cannot protect the US against
weapons delivered by methods other than long-range missiles,
such as by ship or by truck.
A wide range of foreign policy experts and scientists - including
50 Nobel Laureates - have concluded that a national missile
defense system is not technologically feasible. In April 2000,
researchers at the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology issued a report stating that national
missile defense would be ineffective against attacks by emerging
missile states. According to the CIA, many countries are already
developing missile systems that can evade or overwhelm interceptors
used in national missile defense system, and established nuclear
powers like Russia and China already possess countermeasures
and could offer their technology to other countries.
One of the key justifications for missile defense is that the
system will prevent states from blackmailing American decision-makers
with a missile threat. Missile defense supporters argue that
policy makers hiding behind a protective shield could make better
decisions based on US interests. However, to ignore missile
threats American leaders would have to feel extremely confident
that the NMD works. To date, NMD systems failed the easiest
most highly controlled tests.
Rather than improving US security, national missile defense
is likely to backfire. China and Russia, as well as allies such
as Germany, France, and Sweden, have opposed the NMD plan. Germany,
France and our other NATO allies believe that NMD could touch
off another nuclear arms race and that US plans represent the
beginning of a "Fortress America" mentality that would
separate US and European security interests.
The decision of the US to pursue NMD sends a signal to other
countries that rather than investing in arms control as a first
line of defense that is much more capable of creating a more
stable world, the US would rather continue to rely on the Cold
War strategy of peace through military strength. This is a strategy
that perpetuates an arms race the US can "win" that
will return the world to a "balance of terror." Continued
reliance on this strategy will likely lead to a distrust that
will taint current and future arms control negotiations.
Alternatives
More missiles have been destroyed by diplomacy than through
force, indicating the importance of not turning away from first
lines of defense - arms control and diplomacy - in favor of
a last line of defense. There are other ways to protect the
United States from a ballistic missile attack that do not include
the creation of an expensive system that may not work and could
lead to strained foreign relations. Rather than NMD, other options
exist which would achieve similar security objectives and would
make the world safer rather than indulge in a false sense of
security. Some of these options are:
- Take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. U.S. and Russian
nuclear weapons remain on high-alert despite the end of the
Cold War. Retaliatory strikes against a nuclear missile attack
can be launched within 5-10 minutes of detection. If this
reaction time were lengthened, accidental launches could be
avoided, and tensions would be greatly reduced further reducing
nuclear stockpiles (i.e. actively continue to participate
in the START process).
Fewer weapons overall would decrease the probability of a nuclear
exchange. Reduction would also alleviate international fears
that nuclear weapons will remain central to western security
strategy and only by obtaining nuclear weapons can this threat
be addressed.
- Active diplomacy: Instead of alienating countries of concern
by building up military defenses, entering into diplomatic
discussion has a higher chance of averting violent confrontation.
- Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The NMD
option is partially predicated on the worry that non-nuclear
states will develop nuclear weapons. The NPT regime is designed
to address this concern. This regime should be pursued and
up-held fully.
- Implement CTBT: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty creates
an international climate that discourages nuclear explosive
testing which is necessary to develop nuclear weapons. By
ratifying the CTBT and fully supporting the infrastructure
that supports it, proliferation will further be discouraged.
- Fortify groups such as the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), which cooperates to impede the development and spread
of ballistic missiles. MTCR and similar regimes address the
concerns of technology transfer through the diplomatic arena.
The following letter was sent to President Bush outlining the
concerns of various religious groups concerning the NMD program.
Using this letter as a model, please contact the President and
your Senators and Representatives and voice your opinion.
March 2001
The Honorable George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Re: National Missile Defense
Dear Mr. President:
We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations
share with you the desire to keep God's people, including those
in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we
are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to
deploy unproven technology for national missile defense.
First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the
United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles
now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons
in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual
de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of
fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if
the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might
then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead
missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also,
China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far
greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat
of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.
Second, heavy emphasis on unproven anti-missile technology
to counter a speculative future threat from a few small nations
neglects other elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation
strategy. More promising methods include international monitoring
of nuclear test explosions, rigorous fissile material control,
stringent missile technology control, diplomacy, financial assistance
to nations cooperating in nuclear non-proliferation, and countering
social, economic, and political instability that provides the
breeding ground for terrorist groups
Third, we are seriously concerned about budgetary implications.
Since 1983 the United States has spent $69 billion on national
missile defense, enriching major defense contractors but producing
no effective system. President Clinton's plan, which you have
criticized as inadequate, would cost $60 billion. Indications
are that the layered approach you favor could cost more than
$100 billion. A budgetary commitment of this magnitude along
with the tax cut you are promoting would preclude achieving
the goal of "Leave No Child Behind" and dealing with
other urgent domestic needs.
For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous
rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
Respectfully yours,
General Assembly Guidance
The 212th General Assembly (2000) of the Presbyterian Church
(USA) reaffirms its long-standing call to end the arms race,
and urges:
"Ratification of and adherence by the United States to
those existing international treaties that it has not yet accepted,
such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on
Land Mines;"
"Adherence to and implementation of the treaties already
ratified, such as the Chemical Weapons Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or the Biological
Weapons Convention; and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
I and II;"
"Termination of efforts to build and deploy a Missile
Defense System because of its unnecessary and destabilizing
military character;"
"Reexamination by the United States of both its domestic
and international policies, and the seeking of informed public
review of its foreign policy perspective and goals for the twenty-first
century, to the end that the building of security for the twenty-first
century will be based on the extension of the rule of law, the
development of strengthened instruments of international governance,
the strengthening of arms control and disarmament agreements,
the enhancing of instruments of nonviolent conflict resolution,
not on the continued enhancement of technological instruments
of destruction, shaped originally in the context of the cold
war."
Stewardship of Public Life - Global Security
Is published quarterly by the Presbyterian Church (USA), Washington
Office, 110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002. Tel.
202-543-1126.
This article was written by Catherine Gordon of the Washington
Office staff. Series editor: Rich Houston. Issue date: April
2001. For information about regular or email subscriptions or
reprint permission, please contact Rich Houston.
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