Deal with India Harms Nuclear Non-Proliferation

by Catherine Gordon

"To continue to have the "haves" and "have nots" is absolutely unsustainable. Either we continue to rely on nuclear weapons, and face the reality that in the next 10-20 years, 20 or 30 countries will have nuclear weapons, or each country must cease its nuclear program and destroy existing nuclear arsenals." — IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei

During the first week of March, while tensions with Iran over their development of nuclear power were escalating, President Bush traveled to India. He left with a U.S.-India nuclear deal. The verbal agreement states that the U.S. will provide India with nuclear technology and fuel; in exchange India will allow international inspections for 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors. India currently has the capacity to build six to 10 nuclear weapons per year. With this deal it could produce up to 50 nuclear weapons annually.*

[*On March 15 legislation was introduced in the Senate and House Foreign Relations committees to exempt India from sections of the Atomic Energy Act that restrict trade with countries not party to nuclear treaties. India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. It is not eligible for U.S. civilian nuclear technology.]

The agreement undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At a time when efforts are being made to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, the U.S. is following a double standard. It is rewarding India - which has detonated nuclear devices and refused to sign on to the NPT with nuclear technology - while pressuring and threatening Iran (which did sign on to the treaty) not to develop its nuclear capability. Many other aspiring nuclear powers will take note of this inconsistency and behave accordingly.

Because India's civilian and military nuclear programs are not separated, the U.S. could be supplying technology to India that lets it produce weapons grade material. This is very possible, as India has agreed to have only a portion of its nuclear reactors inspected. The deal also could create further tension between India and Pakistan, and offers non-nuclear states an incentive to withdraw from the nonproliferation process.

The PC(USA) has always stood firmly behind the NPT. Since 1946 Presbyterian Assemblies have called for international disarmament and arms control measures as a path toward international disarmament. In 2003 the General Assembly called on all nations to fulfill their commitments under the nonproliferation treaty and "move together with the other nuclear powers ... to the abolition of nuclear weapons." The assembly called on the U.S. to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, permanently end the development, testing, and production of nuclear warheads, and strengthen nonproliferation efforts by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ... locating fissile material worldwide, and negotiating a ban on its production. The Assembly has called for Presbyterians to be conscious of and learn about nuclear disarmament issues so that "they may make extraordinary use of the ordinary means of citizen responsibility to assure the commitment of the United States government toward these ends."

The Non-Proliferation Treaty

The purpose of the NPT is to prevent more countries from obtaining nuclear weapons. The treaty sets up international safeguards (audits and inspections)through which non-nuclear states are ensured fair access to peaceful nuclear technology while gaining commitments that they will not develop nuclear weapons. The treaty:

• Forbids member states without nuclear weapons from developing them;
• Forbids the five member states with nuclear weapons (the U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China) from transferring them to any other state;
• Provides international safeguards so that peaceful nuclear programs in non-nuclear weapons states will not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
• Facilitates access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
• Commits member states to pursue good faith negotiations toward ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.

The treaty was opened for signatures in 1968 and went into effect in 1970. The five nuclear weapons states designated by the treaty were the states that had exploded a nuclear bomb before January 1967. Only three states have not signed the NPT - Israel, Pakistan, and India. North Korea was a signatory but withdrew from the treaty on April 10, 2003. Pakistan and India have detonated nuclear weapons. Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons. However, because they did not test a nuclear device before 1967, if they were to join they would have to disarm, submit to inspections, and join as non-nuclear states. South Africa did possess weapons from 1979 through 1991 but then disarmed and joined the treaty.

Challenges for the Treaty

The NPT mandates that every five years a review conference be held to address key issues and determine its effectiveness. At the 2005 review, the states that are party to the treaty sought to resolve difficult challenges facing the nonproliferation regime. They were not successful. The conference did not develop any new strategies to deal with the three countries not party to the treaty and which now have nuclear weapons. Nor did it arrive at any collective strategy for dealing with North Korea, which some perceive as acquiescence to another nuclear power.

There is increased concern about non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons or material for terrorist attacks, as well as concern about a clandestine nuclear supply network. Anxiety was also expressed about secret weapons development by states like Iran. And while one of NPT's central agreements was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons — with the ultimate goal of eliminating them all — the five nuclear states party to the treaty and the three nuclear states not party to the treaty have among them thirty thousand nuclear weapons.

The Administration Response

Because of the many problems facing nonproliferation, some analysts believe that the nonproliferation strategy so far has not worked and should be abandoned for alternative strategies. It has been suggested that the United States "should extend its nuclear umbrella to guarantee the security of allies and clients, and not impede peaceful states that want to become nuclear powers to deter unfriendly actors in their neighborhoods." One analyst proposes that the U.S. should encourage India to modernize and expand its nuclear force to counter that of China.

This approach seems to be the one that the Bush Administration has adopted. But it is based on the faulty premise that the problem is dangerous governments with dangerous weapons, and not the weapons themselves in the hands of any state. Supporting more nuclear weapons and more nuclear weapons states would make the world a more dangerous place. Arms competitions, like that between India and Pakistan, could intensify, and our ability to control nuclear material would greatly deteriorate. With more nuclear weapons material available, the chances would increase of it ending up in the wrong hands.

A more realistic approach is one that would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Some of the ways the U.S. could do this is by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, refusing to develop new nuclear weapons, removing the U.S. stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and encouraging Russia to reduce its arsenal as well.

The future success of the nonproliferation regime depends on the United States working together with other nations to strengthen rules against nuclear possession, trade and development by any state, addressing regional security issues, and moving towards the fulfillment of the obligations by the nuclear weapons states toward complete nuclear disarmament.