U.S. Policy Unclear, but Security Concerns Could Overwhelm Human Rights Agenda

The reverberations of the terrible events of September 11th will be felt for years to come in U.S. policy on Latin America. The Bush Administration's conservative impulses will be confirmed, while areas where George W. Bush was open to new ideas-his willingness to consider major reforms in U.S.-Mexico immigration, for example-have been dealt a setback. Security concerns are likely to take even greater precedence than usual over human rights and democracy considerations in United States' policy towards the region.

The Battle for Direction

The specific outlines of the Bush Administration's policy towards Latin America are still barely perceptible. The administration's nominee for the highest policy position involving Latin America, the assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, has not yet been filled. The choice of Otto Reich was so unpalatable to Senate Democrats like Christopher Dodd that they have refused to schedule a hearing to consider his nomination. Mr. Reich earned this reputation as head of Reagan's "Office of Public Diplomacy," which used taxpayer dollars to draft and place editorials and op-eds supporting the president's Central America policy. He is also known for his work as a lobbyist for Bacardi, drafting the punitive Helms-Burton act against Cuba, and for Lockheed Martin, pushing sales of high-tech fighter jets for Chile, thus ending a long-standing agreement not to sell advanced weapons systems to Latin America. If confirmed, Mr. Reich will be an unabashedly conservative force, expected to focus attention on anti-Castro activities. Whether or not he is confirmed, however, the administra- tion's Latin America appointees are a dream team of staunchly conservative veterans of the Central America wars during the Reagan-Bush years, notably former assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs Elliott Abrams, convicted of lying to Congress during the Iran-contra scandal, now a National Security Council advisor on democracy and human rights, and John Negroponte, who as ambassador to Honduras played down human rights abuses by the Honduran army, now ambassador to the U.N.

The Andean Region/Counternarcotics

Colombia and the Andean region will be the most difficult policy challenge for the administration. At this point, the administration appears to be following the same disturbing direction as its predecessor, providing the third installment of an enormous package of military and social aid to Colombia and surrounding countries. With the laudable goals of combating drug abuse and drug-related violence, as well as aiding Colombia, the Clinton Administration launched a risky strategy in the region. The strategy is based on strengthening Colombia's military, known for pervasive ties with paramilitary forces which commit some 70 per- cent of the killings of civilians in the brutal civil war. It also relies upon aerial fumigation of the illicit crops of small farmers who produce the bulk of the country's coca and opium poppy crops, a harshly punitive strategy aimed at the poorest link in the drug trafficking chain. The Clinton and Bush administrations have presented this as a balanced approach that strengthens the mili- tary but also provides social aid. But while the military training and equipment flowed, the softer side of the package-alternative development programs to help small farmers switch to legal crops and judicial and human rights assistance-has barely begun to be delivered. Many human rights, peace and humanitarian organizations in Colombia fear that the strategy will escalate the conflict.

The impact of the growing counternarcotics budget as a means of expanding U.S. military training in Latin America is evident in the numbers: in 2000, for the first time since before the Alliance for Progress, total security assistance to Latin America exceed total economic assistance (about $900 million versus $800 million) (Kate Doyle and Adam Isacson, "A New New World Order," NACLA Report on the Americas, Nov/Dec 2001, p. 20).

Also disturbing is the possible drift towards expanding the U.S. mission in Colombia from counter- narcotics to deeper involvement in Colombia's counterinsurgency war. Moreover, human rights organizations are concerned that the Bush Administration may be even less interested in providing pressure on the Colombian military for its human rights record than its predecessor. There are, however, some minimal safeguards put in place by Congress in the FY2002 foreign aid bill. Conditions holding up assistance if human rights progress is not made and requiring the administration to certify that there is no human health impact from fumigation and that alternative development programs are actually implemented provide some limited leverage.

Peru will present some interesting choices for the administration. Peru's new President, Alejandro Toledo, has introduced democratic and judicial reforms, and is engaged in intensive efforts to reveal and punish human rights crimes and corruption carried out by ex-president Fujimori and his shadowy intelligence boss Vladimir Montesinos-once U.S. allies. The administration is expected to support these reforms to a degree; the question is how far.

Mexico

President Bush's personal connection with President Vicente Fox and his recognition of the importance of the Hispanic vote in the United States makes this particularly important moment in U.S.-Mexico relations rather unpredictable. Fox faces monumental challenges as the first president to defeat the 70-year reign of the corrupt PRI regime. Managing an unstable economy, dealing with the Chiapas peace process, opening a Pandora's box of revelations into the human rights crime and massive corruption implicating much of Mexico's governing elite, instituting reforms of the judicial system, police and electoral process, are just some of these challenges.

The U.S. and Mexico were at the brink of discussing substantial reforms to immigration when September 11th halted the momentum towards opening borders. Nonetheless, it is possible that limited reforms involving legalization of the status of some illegal workers and temporary guest workers programs are still on the table.

Cuba

President Bush's debt to Florida's Cuban-Americans in the close Florida vote, his nomination of Otto Reich, and the impact of September 11th on relations with a country seen by many as a supporter of terrorism effectively close off avenues to any softening of U.S. policy towards Cuba. Momentum for legislation to lift the embargo on food and medicine and weaken restrictions on travel to Cuba evapor- ated after September 11th. However, the coalition of groups working to reform U.S.-Cuba relations is strong and diverse, from humanitarian and religious organizations to U.S. business interests. These groups can be counted on to find creative ways to keep this effort alive.

Central America

The primary U.S. policy issue facing Central America at this point is the implementation of substantial packages of U.S. aid following a series of disasters-Hurricane Mitch, the Salvadoran earthquake, and the recent drought. However, serious underlying problems may call the attention of policymakers. For much of Central America, the promises of the peace accords are still unmet. Plagued by poverty and inequality, Central America has been particularly hard hit by the series of natural disasters and by the dramatic fall in coffee prices, caused in part by the disintegration of an international coffee agreement and by the flood of cheap coffee from Vietnam and other producers. In Guatemala in particular, imperative structural reforms in the judicial system and military were never carried out. Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala have high levels of official corruption which continue to sap public trust in government. It is too early to tell if the Bush Administration will at least pay lip service to the still unfulfilled peace process reform agenda; if energy will be diverted to unproductive anxiety over the continued strength of the Sandinista party in Nicaragua, or if Central America will simply be ignored.

Trade

The fast track trade bill, blocked for years by a coalition of citizen's groups, unions, environmentalists and affected industries, finally squeaked through the House of Representatives this fall. This gives the administration a green light to advance negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas as well as other trade agreements. In reality, negotiations have been going on for years despite the lack of formal negotiating authority, but this will give some impetus to the effort. The Bush Administration will undoubtedly pay less attention to environmental and labor rights issues in trade negotiations than did its predecessor.

Impact of September 11th

In the aftermath of September 11th, Latin American governments and militaries took advantage of the tragedy to make pitches to the U.S. to help them in their "fight against terrorism." Politicians and agencies favoring the drug war harped on the connection between drugs and terror- ism; forgetting that not only the Taliban but the Northern Alliance profited from drugs. A new account of $21 million for funding counter- terrorism activities was added to the defense bill-not a large sum, but important because it sets a precedent for a new, unaccountable source of funding for military training that could undercut human rights condi- tions, which are usually added to the foreign aid bill, not the defense bill. Next year could see a larger increase in counterterrorism funding, likely to be less serious training against real international terrorism threats than the usual U.S. strengthening of Latin American armies, irrespective of their human rights records, for internal security purposes.

Indeed, human rights conditions and policies and accountability over U.S. military programs are at great risk. One human rights reform with resonance in Latin America was revoked within weeks of September 11th-the CIA guidelines requiring agents to consult with their director when paying human "assets" implicated in human rights abuses. This reform was instituted in 1995 after it was revealed that the CIA was paying a Guatemalan colonel implicated in the murder of the husband of one American citizen and the coverup of the murder of another. At that point, some 1,000 CIA assets who were both not producing useful information and implicated in human rights abuses, corruption and criminal activity were removed from the CIA rolls-and most of them were in Latin America. Former CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz argued that these guidelines never stopped the CIA from hiring a human rights violator actually needed for information, and that the CIA's real weakness was lack of agents with knowledge of the languages and cultures of the countries where terrorists operated. But the guidelines were revoked.

Finally, the Bush Administration's unusual passion for secrecy may have a negative impact on Latin America in terms of example and contributions of U.S. documents. In the last several years Latin American governments have made substantial progress in opening the files on past human rights abuses, from the Salvadoran and Guatemalan truth commissions, to current revelations regarding Fujimori in Peru and the 1968 student massacre in Mexico. The Clinton Administration supported these processes both morally and with historical records by opening its own files to a degree on Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and other countries. Bush's executive order limiting release of presidential records, largely undoing precedents set in 1978, does not bode well.

The United States, and its foreign policy, is still reeling from the aftershocks of September 11th. Latin America policy in this context is difficult to predict. It is clear, however, that any human rights agenda will face greater obstacles than in the days of innocence ending the tenth of September.