The year 2003 will not be smooth sailing for U.S.-Latin American relations. A conservative U.S. administration will meet a range of populist leaders elected in major Latin American nations. With tunnel vision focused on the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration will find it hard even to understand, much less to react to carefully, the complex dynamics in the region.

Facing a Wave of Populism

Popular dissatisfaction with economic reforms has resulted in election of leaders willing to challenge, to a limited degree, the “Washington consensus” on economic policy. The most stunning development is the election of Luiz Ignacio da Silva to run Latin America’s largest nation, with over 61 percent of the vote. Popularly known as “Lula,” da Silva is a founder of the Workers Party (PT). In his fourth, finally successful bid for the presidency, da Silva toned down his anti-IMF rhetoric and promised to comply with outgoing President Cardoso’s debt repayment schedule. Nonetheless, da Silva’s election will shake things up. A major player in the hemisphere, Brazil could demand changes in the negotiating of the Free Trade Area of the Americas and moderate the influence of international financial institutions. This power will only work, however, if da Silva, who has never held executive office before, manages Brazilian domestic affairs skillfully.

In Ecuador, former colonel Lucio Gutierrez won the presidency in November. Gutierrez had led a group of military officers who backed an indigenous uprising to oust corrupt President Jamil Mahuad. After spending some months in detention, Gutierrez formed a party and tried for the presidency the democratic way. He beat out wealthy businessman Alvaro Noboa, whose harsh treatment of workers on his banana plantations may have helped to undercut his populist rhetoric.

Gutierrez’s performance as president is hard to predict. He has attempted to reassure foreign investors and promised to privatize state-owned banks. On the other hand, his backing by the indigenous federation CONAIE and labor unions will push him in a more populist direction.

Already in conflict with the United States is President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Opposition parties, unions and business have organized openly President Chavez to step down or call early elections. These sectors have been angry at Chavez’s fiery rhetoric and authoritarian actions. Chavez, however, retains considerable support from poor Venezuelans who believe that his government has paid greater attention to their concerns than the traditional Venezuelan political elite. The United States faced international embarrassment in April 2001 when the State Department hurriedly backed a short-lived coup against Chavez while the rest of the Organization of American States pronounced a much more principled support for democratic process. While the United States back off from its support for the coup, it seems likely the Bush Administration will continue to find ways to encourage the Venezuelan opposition’s call for early elections.

Ignoring Mexico

When President Bush took office, he advertised his affinity to Mexican President Vicente Fox and promised a new era in U.S.-Mexican relations. The Mexican government and public hoped this would lead to serious reforms of U.S.-Mexican immigration issues and a more constructive approach to the shared border. However, September 11th dashed these hopes as U.S. immigration law was applied more strictly and the Bush Administration showed little sensitivity to Mexican concerns. The low point in U.S.-Mexican relations came when President Bush, irritated at President Fox’s insistence on talking immigration when he wanted the focus on Iraq, cut off the official translator at an international meeting in Mexico as she was translating Fox’s remarks. Secretary of State Colin Powell shortly afterwards visited Mexico apparently to repair the damage, but there are few illusions that immigration reform will be back on the agenda.

Embracing Colombia

The Bush Administration has wholeheartedly endorsed hardline President Alvaro Uribe, who came to office August 7th with strong support from Colombians tired of guerrilla abuses, including the cruel and extensive practice of kidnapping for profit. Uribe has already moved to install a state of emergency, allowing security forces to tap phones, search houses and carry out detentions without warrants and establishing military control in some areas of the country. Colombian civil society organizations critical of the Colombian army’s poor human rights record–principally, links between its members and brutal rightwing paramilitary forces-- fear that these measures will be turned against them and against ordinary Colombian citizens, not just against the guerrillas. Such fears seem justified by a recent search of the offices of the Permanent Assembly for Peace and a nighttime raid on the National University.

In 2002, the U.S. Congress officially expanded the US mission in Colombia from counternarcotics to counterterrorism. In the Colombian context, this is a green light for U.S. involvement in Colombia’s complex, decades-old civil war. The first major expansion is training troops to guard the Occidental oil pipeline in Arauca province, one of the areas under military control.

The U.S.-Colombian relationship is deeply troubling. The mission expansion has the potential to embroil the United States in a major war. Of equal concern, the United States’ commitment to Colombia and the post-September 11th context leads the U.S. government to ignore serious abuses of human rights by the Colombian military and increasingly authoritarian rule by the Uribe Administration.

Opposing Corruption in Central America

An unexpected bright spot for U.S. policy towards Latin America may be the Bush Administration’s efforts against corrupt leaders in Central America. In Nicaragua, the United States has supported President Bolanos’s efforts to go after millions allegedly stolen by ex-President Arnoldo Aleman. Once Washington’s dream candidate, Aleman lost U.S. support when he was accused of syphoning off an estimated $100 million in public funds–equivalent to what the Somoza dynasty was alleged to have stolen over four decades. In Guatemala, acting Secretary of State Otto Reich commented strongly and publicly on the charges of corruption that swirl around President Alfonso Portillo. The administration appears rightly concerned about the shadowy group of ex-military officers and other hardliners who appear to be behind some of the corruption, drug trafficking, and threats to human rights workers today in Guatemala.

No Budging on Cuba

With fiercely anti-Castro Otto Reich appointed in 2002 as acting assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, and with Bush dependent upon Florida for his presidency, there was no hope for any thaw in U.S.-Cuba relations in 2002. This is likely to continue in 2003 despite the ever-increasing congressional and business sector support for easing aspects of the U.S. embargo. Reich himself, however, has run into trouble, unable to gain confirmation from the Democratic-led Senate in 2002. Facing a more moderate Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2003, Richard Lugar replacing the retiring Jesse Helms, the Bush Administration appointed Reich to a position as special envoy to the Americas. It appears that the administration may choose not to renominate Reich as assistant secretary. Reich’s successor, however, will surely continue the same Cuba policy.

Trade

The Bush Administration, with fast track authority already granted and an all-Republican Congress, will want to move forward on the Free Trade Area of the Americas and several bilateral agreements. First up is CAFTA, the Central America trade agreement, where the United States is likely to take quick action with Central American governments which are both pro-trade and poorly prepared to defend national interests. FTAA and other bilateral agreements, however, will be complicated by the election of da Silva and other more populist leaders in Latin America.

Interesting Times Ahead

The Bush Administration has no tools to understand the popular discontent in Latin America over economic reforms and thus is poorly prepared to react constructively to the rise of populist governments or to the economic disaster facing Argentina. Populist governments, however, will be limited by the need to maintain foreign investment, international financial support and the support of domestic business interests. Growing U.S. support for a Colombian government more authoritarian and less concerned with human rights than its predecessor has real perils. 2003 promises to be an interesting year at best for US-Latin American relations.

By Lisa Haugaard