In 2004, once again the Bush Administration faces a wave of populist governments in Latin America and a complex set of dynamics it is ill prepared to address or even comprehend. Among other challenges, the Administration will be facing the aftermath of the social revolt in Bolivia that forced its president to resign after pursuing an unpopular mix of free-market economic and harsh counternarcotics policies advocated by the United States.

In 2004, the Bush Administration will continue to promote trade negotiations that widen inequalities, insist upon strong counternarcotics policies and step up what it perceives as the Latin America version of the war on terrorism. It will face a gradually increasing reaction to these policies without understanding how they contribute to a persistent instability in the region.

Bolivia Rising

On a 2002 visit to Washington, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada warned President Bush that while he would push ahead with coca eradication plans, he needed more money to soften the impact on farmers. If he did not get that, he cautioned, he would be back next year — seeking political asylum (Larry Rohter, “Bolivian Leader’s Ouster Seen as Warning on U.S. Drug Policy,” New York Times, 10/23/03.) He received only a fraction of the aid he requested. Today he is living in exile in the United States after a popular uprising.

The decision by the Sánchez government to permit the export of Bolivian natural gas by transnational companies was the spark for the protests that led to the president’s resignation in October 2003. However, this was merely the last straw in a widespread discontent over economic policies that have failed to improve the situation of many Bolivians. Coca eradication strategies pursued without adequate alternatives also played a role, as Bolivia’s highly organized coca farmers joined in the protests.

The protests escalated when Bolivia’s military killed five protestors September 20th. As protests swelled, some 60-80 protestors were killed and hundreds wounded. The president resigned and vice president Carlos Mesa assumed interim control.

The United States, which backed the Sánchez government to the end, was forced to sit on the sidelines. The U.S. Andean counternarcotics strategy is challenged by the Bolivian situation. As severe counternarcotics strategies in Colombia finally begin to bring down coca production in that country, production is moving back to Bolivia. The U.S. government will find it difficult to put pressure on the fragile Mesa government as angry Bolivians demand more responsive economic policies. The United States will continue to invest heavily in these counternarcotics strategies despite one more example of the “balloon effect,” in which in the face of constant demand for illegal drugs, primarily from the United States, production moves back and forth from one country to the next.

Brazil, Venezuela

With a landmark year, the Lula government in Brazil has made some grand proposals to improve social justice. Implementing these plans — his signature anti-hunger campaign, employment generating activities, land titles for slum residents — has, however, been a bumpy affair. Expect close scrutiny of these programs in the upcoming year.

U.S.- Brazil relations will continue to be dominated by FTAA negotiations, with Brazil playing hardball on agricultural products, including by promoting a sign-on-to-what-you-like treaty rather than a comprehensive one. Lula’s skilled negotiating ability has made the United States treat him more cautiously than Venezuelan President Chavez—but relations are strained.

The importance of Venezuela and U.S. involvement there has increased dramatically in the last year—in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt against President Hugo Chavez in March 2003 and uncertainly about the U.S. role in that event, and in light of the recent recall petition effort to remove President Chavez from office. In mid-December, opposition leaders turned in 3.46 million signatures on the recall petition, claiming to have collected nearly 1 million signatures more than required to force a constitutionally-mandated vote to remove the controversial president and ensure a new presidential election. The National Electoral Council (CNE) has the task of verifying the signatures and determining if such a vote in mandated. If enough signatures are verified, it is anticipated that a vote on removing the president will take place in April 2004. Argentina

In Argentina, President Nestor Kirchner has presided over a surprisingly effective government. Argentina’s dire economic straits are gradually improving, and the IMF has indicated it is disposed to continued debt renegotiation. Kirchner has urged prosecution of army officials involved in Argentina’s dirty war (1976-83). In 2004, the Supreme Court is expected to make a final ruling on the constitutionality of the amnesty laws that had protected the military from prosecution. If they are ruled unconstitutional, cases against army officials will move forward.

Colombia: The Conflict Intensifies

In Colombia, the Bush Administration is strongly backing hardline President Alvaro Uribe’s efforts to step up the war against the FARC guerrillas. The FARC is a brutal force that relies on the cruel practice of kidnapping to finance its operations and conducts indiscriminate bombing attacks.

However, the methods used by the Colombian government to combat the FARC are of mounting concern. The Colombian government has done little to break links between the army and brutal rightwing paramilitary forces, which have been responsible for the majority of extrajudicial killings of civilians. The Uribe administration has pursued a series of repressive anti-terrorist measures, including legislation that grants the military powers normally reserved for the police, such as the right to detain, investigate and interrogate suspects. In mass detentions, security forces have swept up local political leaders and union and community activists. Moreover, President Uribe, before an audience of the armed forces’ leadership and on primetime television, accused human rights defenders of being defenders of terrorism, putting their lives at greater risk and undermining the legitimacy of human rights work.

U.S. policy appears to be hardening, as the U.S. embassy’s role in upholding the importance of human rights work has diminished with the appointment of a new ambassador. Moreover, the aerial spraying program, which blankets large areas of the countryside with herbicides, is expanding. This program destroys both coca and food crops of local farmers, many of them poor, indigenous or Afro-Colombian. While some alternative development programs are provided to help farmers switch to legal crops, many farmers are subject to spraying without assistance, or even food aid when their food crops are destroyed. The program will begin spraying in Colombia’s ecologically rich natural parks in 2004.

The United States will increasingly attempt to characterize the Colombian conflict in the anti-terrorism framework. This is misleading, given that one of the three terrorist groups in Colombia, the paramilitaries, is allied with the army the United States is funding. It also narrows U.S policy remedies to military aid rather than support for negotiated solutions and diplomatic pressure on the Colombian government and military to improve respect for human rights.

Central America

On December 16, Central American nations and the United States reached a Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Costa Rica refused to sign, although it may join later. CAFTA, which has weak labor and environmental provisions, is especially concerning to small farmers in Central America, who will not be able to compete with U.S. corn, rice and other crops, and to U.S. textile manufacturers, who were alarmed that products made with fabric from countries outside Central America will be imported to the United States duty-free. The United States was able to win concessions that will harm Central American farmers while defending U.S. farm subsidies that undercut Central American exports.

CAFTA faces a stiff fight in the U.S. Congress from members concerned with labor rights, unions and textile manufacturers, as well as from humanitarian, religious and grassroots groups concerned with the impact on poor Central American farmers.

Efforts to fight corruption in Central America have been the one bright spot in the Bush Administration’s Latin America policy. The administration supported the creation of an international commission to investigate clandestine groups linked to the army and the Portillo government in Guatemala in 2003, as well as efforts to bring former Nicaraguan president Arnoldo Aleman to justice for allegedly stealing $100 million in public funds. In 2004, it will be important to see if the Bush Administration will continue pressure on corruption issues that still persist, now that the Portillo administration has ended and Aleman received twenty years of house arrest.

Cuba

President Bush’s hardline policy towards Cuba is virtually guaranteed not to soften in an election year. However, maneuvers by House Republican leadership to prevent legislation lifting the ban on travel to Cuba from reaching the President’s desk is irritating increasing bipartisan majorities in Congress who favor an end to the ban. There will be concerted efforts in 2004 to finally lay the forty-decade old travel ban to rest.

Mexico

A major challenge confronting Mexico in the upcoming year will be how to implement the comprehensive human rights analysis and recommendations completed by the United Nations in November 2003. While human rights advocates in Mexico were dealt a setback with the Fox Administration’s dismissal of the effective government human rights official Mariclaire Acosta, the UN recommendations will provide human rights groups with a concrete roadmap in 2004 which will help to prod the Mexican government to improve its judicial system and protect human rights.

Expect U.S. congressional outrage against lack of progress in investigating the murders of women in Ciudad Juarez to continue picking up steam — with a congressional resolution condemning the violence there introduced in November 2003 for action in 2004, we can anticipate U.S. pressure to resolve these crimes to continue. As for the big enchilada — immigration reform — expect the Bush administration to increase its rhetoric on this topic to court Latino voters. However, the likelihood of any significant changes to immigration policy: slim to none.

Conclusion

Complex realities in Latin America will make the United States’ too-simplistic solution--harsh counternarcotics strategies, military aid in support of the war on terrorism, and trade promotion—even harder to apply than usual. While the administration will continue to apply these remedies despite lack of success or negative popular reaction, U.S. citizens can use dynamic events in the region to urge members of Congress and presidential candidates to take a fresh look, and begin to develop more humane and effective approaches.

Written by Lisa Haugaard of the Latin America Working Group.