Outlook 2006: Challenges from the Left, as the U.S. Goes Deeper in Colombia, and Ponders Mexican Security Fence

by Lisa Haugaard

As the U.S. proceeds through the second term of one of our most conservative Presidents, Latin America takes a stroll to the left. Protest leader Evo Morales' election as President of Bolivia in December consolidated a trend obvious since 2002 and the election of Brazil's Luiz da Silva. Mutual discomfort between the Bush Administration and Latin American leaders was highlighted by the awkward Fourth Summit of the Americas meeting in November 2005 in Mar del Plata.

Competing Visions

The sheer number of Latin American left-wing leaders and the United States' preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan and other foreign policy challenges has forced the Bush Administration to accept certain hemispheric realities. U.S. concerns have narrowed to the fiery Venezuelan leader, Hugo Chávez, Bolivian coca grower Morales, and old enemy Fidel Castro - while Argentina's Nestor Kirchner, Brazil's Lula and Chile's Ricardo Lagos, with their milder rhetoric and left-center positions, are accepted almost grate-fully. Yet while leaders like Lula and Kirchner have dialed down the rhetoric, they have not backed down on their most keenly felt difference with the U.S. - their vision of trade.

The United States' hopes for progress on a Free Trade Area of the Americas were dashed in the Mar del Plata summit, which dissolved with- out issuing a common declaration. Five nations representing a large percentage of the hemisphere's population - Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay - issued a statement that challenged free trade orthodoxy, stating that "the necessary conditions are not yet in place for achieving a balanced and equitable free trade agreement ... that takes into account the needs and sensitivities of all partners, as well as the differences in the levels of development and size of the economies." Meanwhile, outside the summit walls, a rally addressed by Chávez championed Latin American regional solidarity and railed against economic policies that have not resulted in equitable development.

Stymied on the regional agreement, the United States will focus this year on another agreement it sees as a building block, the Andean Free Trade Agreement. This regional agreement similar to NAFTA and CAFTA is much more likely to advance. Yet, like CAFTA, it will then face a fight in the U.S. Congress, where the costs of these free trade agreements to U.S. workers are increasingly recognized.

The Populist Challenge

Venezuelan President Chávez does not shy away from rhetorically tackling his giant neighbor to the north. With his "Bolivarian" vision, he is seeking to inspire a region-wide Latin American solidarity and to challenge U.S. power in the hemisphere. One positive manifestation of this is the new region-wide television station, Telesur.

The United States has put itself in a tough position with Venezuela. Having provided support for a failed coup attempt, and then having backed a referendum which reaffirmed Chávez's popularity, the U.S. does not have grounds to challenge the democratic legitimacy of the Chávez government. Yet a restrictive media law, large military aircraft purchases, and the concentration of power in presidential hands are valid concerns.

Evo Morales' election inspires high anxiety in U.S. policymakers. As the leader of Bolivia's coca growers, he represents a direct challenge to U.S. counternarcotics policy. Coca in Bolivia is not only the source for illegal, destructive cocaine but a traditionally-used substance for chewing and coca tea, which has given the growers greater legitimacy. U.S.-backed alternative development programs have not provided peasants with adequate economic substitutes for profitable coca, and tension between coca growers and U.S.-funded military and police have resulted in human rights abuses. More broadly, however, Morales represents the concern by a majority of the Bolivian population that neoliberal economic policies have not resulted in improvements in daily life.

Despite the affirmation he received in being the first Bolivian president since 1982 to be elected with an outright majority vote, Morales has a difficult road ahead. Bolivian popular movements have proved themselves impatient and powerful, and have brought down several recent governments. The international community will demand that the country stay the course in counternarcotics, even if Morales has some space to modify those counternarcotics policies.

The U.S. challenge in facing this populist wave is to take it calmly, and understand that these leaders have gained support because of deep-seated concerns about the failure of specific economic policies to deliver better livelihoods to historically impoverished as well as middle-class sectors of Latin America's population. Whether the Bush Administration manages to have the wisdom to react calmly is this year's $64,000 question.

Military vs. Economic Aid

Despite the obvious primacy of economic issues rather than military conflict, the U.S. continues to provide equal military and economic assistance to Latin America. This trend marks a departure from policy prior to 2000, when U.S. support for Plan Colombia boosted military aid significantly. Even at the height of the Cold War, economic aid far surpassed military assistance to the hemisphere.

One disturbing trend is the increase in Defense Department, rather than State Department, control over foreign military training programs. The Defense budget now funds 57 percent of all Latin Americans who receive U.S. training. Switching programs from State to Defense is an important move, for it lessens congressional and executive oversight and could weaken human rights restrictions.

Stagnating development aid to Latin America fails to meet the demand for U.S. support. Central American countries affected by Hurricane Stan, for example, received emergency aid but no increase for reconstruction. In 2006, it will be key to encourage a more generous response to these natural disasters and the granting of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Guatemalans in the U.S., and an extension of TPS for Salvadorans, so that family members in the United States can continue sending the estimated $4.5 billion annually in remittances home that will be essential for rebuilding.

Colombia: The United States Goes in Deeper

The U.S. continues to deepen its involvement in Colombia's conflict. Colombia, with some $600 million per year in U.S. aid, is the world's largest U.S. military-aid recipient outside of the Middle East. While Plan Colombia expired this year, the United States can be expected to supply the same 80 percent military package to the country for the next several years. No longer limited to focus on drugs, U.S. training and logistical support backed a major anti-insurgent offensive in Colombia known as "Plan Patriota."

In 2006, however, the contradictions in U.S. policy are beginning to surface. The U.S. is backing a messy demobilization of the right-wing paramilitaries responsible for massive human rights abuses and drug trafficking. While the goal of demobilization is posi-tive, the trade-off is little or no jail time for human rights abusers and drug kingpins, and a postponement of the serious effort at truth and justice that peace will require. Plus, there are doubts that the paramilitaries' underlying financial, military and drug-trafficking structures are being dismantled.

The General Accounting Office has questioned gains in the drug war, which continue to shift coca production from place to place without demonstrating sustained impact on U.S. price or supply.

Human rights abuses by the Colombian army are becoming difficult to ignore. Some 12.5 percent of U.S. military aid in the foreign aid bill was frozen for seven months in 2005 because the State Department did not have adequate grounds to certify that Colombia met the human rights conditions in the law. At issue were cases alleging extrajudicial executions by the military, such as the killing of three trade unionists in Arauca province, and the murder of two families in the "peace community" of San José de Apartadó.

Loss of Moral Authority

The Bush Administration's disregard for international law has taken a toll on its moral authority in Latin America. While Latin Americans who have suffered through U.S.-supported 'Southern Cone' dictatorships and repressive Central American military regimes have no illusions about the dark side of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. democratic traditions, civil liberties, vibrant culture and economy are admired. But the invasion of Iraq for elusive weapons of mass destruction, the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, the revelations of clandestine prisons in Europe, and the Vice President's shameful efforts to keep a CIA loophole for torture (and the heartless response to Hurricane Katrina) have resonated through Latin American papers and public opinion.

The U.S. campaign against the International Criminal Court (ICC), barely covered in the press, is a significant tension in Latin America. In 2002, Congress passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act, which cuts off some military aid to countries that have joined the ICC but refused to sign an "article 98" agreement in which the country pledges not to bring charges against U.S. citizens in the ICC. This was later extended to cover one kind of economic assistance, ESF. A dozen Latin American countries have refused to sign such agreements, triggering some cutoffs of military and economic assistance.

The U.S. is thus punishing countries that chose to support an international human rights process. For those who believe our country should stand for support of human rights, this is a step backwards.

Immigration/Border

When President Bush took office, his friendship with Mexican President Vicente Fox raised hopes for some progress on immigration. President Bush expressed sympathy for expanding guest worker programs desired by businesses, and last year the door seemed open to more serious discussion of immigration reform. But the anti-immigration tide of public opinion signals a difficult year ahead.

At the end of 2005 the House passed a border bill that increased enforcement and extended construction of a fortified fence along the border. The Mexican government and media reacted with dismay to this bill, which will go to the Senate in 2006. The fencing has added to migrant deaths crossing the border, as migrants are squeezed out to more dangerous desert areas. At the same time, such fences do not offer a solution to keeping out criminals or terrorists, or stopping the immigration tide.

The U.S. could easily address the strains in Latin American relations. The U.S. must be more generous and realistic than providing military aid - and building fences to keep Latin Americans out. A greater spirit of hemispheric cooperation, greater understanding of the need for trade and economic policies to address poverty and unequal development, generosity in response to natural disasters and aid for the poorest nations, and greater attention to human rights principles would go far to resolve tensions. But these are not in the cards for 2006.